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Chapter 1
Introduction
Why is economic activity spatially clustered? Nobel Prize winner Paul Krug-
man was the first to address and investigate this question in a full-fledged gen-
eral equilibrium setup. In his seminal paper introducing the core-periphery
model (Krugman (1991b)) he explains why, how and when agglomeration of
productive factors emerges. Since then, numerous papers and books have
contributed toward a better understanding of the spatial organization of
economic activity all cumulating in the New Economic Geography (NEG)
approach.1 By focusing on the interaction of trade costs, increasing returns
at the firm level, monopolistic competition and factor mobility NEG models
can explain agglomeration processes due to self-reinforcing circular causality
effects between factor rewards and demand patterns which are strengthened
for high levels of economic integration.
As documented by the latest World Bank (2009) development report
on economic geography, spatial inequalities still constitute a highly rele-
vant topic among both economists and policy makers. Ongoing worldwide
economic integration trends call for rigorous explanations of agglomeration
processes that also account for recent economic developments possibly inter-
fering and changing the standard lines of arguing developed so far. This is
where the present thesis steps in by noting that countries are currently not
only facing the impacts of higher economic integration but are also increas-
1See for example Fujita et al. (1999), Baldwin et al. (2003) or Combes et al. (2008) for
an overview of the NEG literature.
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ingly confronted with the economic challenges from demographic change (see
e.g. the special report on aging populations of The Economist (2009)). In
particular, declining fertility has caused upward shifts in the mean age of
most countries’ populations while simultaneously reducing their population
growth rates (see Eurostat (2004) and United Nations (2007)).
Up to now, demographic change has been completely ignored in the NEG
literature. This is surprising for several reasons. Most importantly, both
demographic change and economic integration crucially influence demand
patterns that are themselves decisive for the spatial distribution of economic
activity. Analyzing agglomeration without accounting for demographic de-
velopments thus misses a crucial explanatory determinant. Similarly, the fact
that NEG models are genuinely dynamic indicates that life-cycle decisions
and population aging will play a prominent role in the analysis. What is thus
obviously required is a framework that studies the common consequences of
economic integration on the one hand and demographic change on the other
hand on the spatial distribution of economic activity.
The present thesis provides this explanatory framework with a view to an-
swering how demographic structures impact upon agglomeration processes.
Three closely related papers, each forming one main chapter, will contribute
toward analyzing different aspects of this broadly defined research question.
By focusing on the effects of demographic change on both the spatial dis-
tribution of economic activity and on the linkage between growth and ag-
glomeration, they close one substantial gap existing so far in the theoretical
economics literature on agglomeration processes. While the first and third
paper focus on the impact of introducing demography into the analysis of
agglomeration processes by comparing a situation that fully ignores demo-
graphic structures to one that allows for them, the second contribution ex-
plicitly considers how demographic change, in particular population aging,
influences the spatial distribution of economic activity.
The distinguishing characteristic of all three contributions is their method-
ological approach. They analyze the linkage between demography and ag-
glomeration based on a unified theoretical model that merges two different
research strands. While a NEG component forms the first building block,
2
an overlapping generation framework, which is typically used for studying
the impact of demography on macroeconomic aggregates, is incorporated to
allow for intertemporal life-cycle decisions. Combining these two areas is the
most immediate way to arrive at a model that can accurately analyze and
explain agglomeration processes in societies that are subject to demographic
change.
The first paper2 develops this benchmark model by generalizing the con-
structed capital model of Baldwin (1999), which is a NEG set-up featuring
catastrophic agglomeration of capital stocks due to different accumulation
rates, to account for an overlapping generation structure and lifetime uncer-
tainty a` la Blanchard (1985). In particular, while Baldwin (1999) ignores
demographic structures by deriving the equilibrium dynamics based on in-
tertemporally optimized behavior of a representative individual with an in-
finite planning horizon, we allow for the possibility of death and thus for
age-dependent heterogeneity of individuals. This makes it possible, for the
first time, to establish and analyze the main linkage between demography
and agglomeration processes. By equalizing the birth to the death rate and
thus keeping population size constant, we, however, focus on changes in the
population age structure and ignore variations in the population growth rate
due to demographic change. This is relaxed in the second paper3 that ex-
tends the above benchmark model with a view to focusing on the impacts
of changes in both the population mean age and the population growth rate
on agglomeration processes. To do so, it incorporates a more detailed anal-
ysis of demographic change by taking up the overlapping generation set-up
of Buiter (1988) and therefore allowing for unequal birth and death rates
and hence nonzero population growth. Within this framework we are able
2This paper presented in chapter 2, whose working paper version is also available at
the WU (see Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009)), was jointly written with Klaus
Prettner. While Klaus Prettner solved the individual utility maximization problem and
calibrated the model, I derived the aggregate laws of motion for expenditures and capital
and analyzed the stability properties of the resulting dynamic system.
3This paper is again joint work with Klaus Prettner. In particular, we together set
up the model framework to arrive at the dynamic system describing the evolution of
the economy. I then performed the stability analysis in order to find out how different
demographic structures impact upon agglomeration processes.
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to differentiate between the effects of varying birth and mortality rates and
can also assess agglomeration processes for various demographic scenarios,
including the one of declining fertility resulting in both population aging and
slower population growth as recently faced by many industrialized countries.
Moreover, it allows to identify an additional linkage between demography
and agglomeration that augments the one already found in the first paper.
Finally, the third essay presents one further extension to the benchmark
model of paper one by additionally accounting for endogenous growth due
to learning effects. In particular, I incorporate a notion of learning as in
Baldwin et al. (2001) to arrive at a NEG framework featuring both endoge-
nous growth and demographic change. The resulting model can not only be
used to again assess the impact of demography on agglomeration processes
but also to analyze how lifetime uncertainty impacts upon long-run growth
perspectives. In doing so, the main focus is on the linkage between growth
and the spatial distribution of economic activity with a view to evaluating
the pro-growth effect of spatial agglomeration in a setting that allows for
demographic structures. The model’s equilibrium dynamics moreover make
it possible to also pay attention to the impact of lifetime uncertainty on
history-versus-expectations considerations, i.e. on the question of equilib-
rium selection in a setting with multiple equilibria.
Each of the three papers clearly reveals that demographic structures are
of crucial importance for agglomeration processes. In particular, they all
confirm one main finding. Introducing overlapping generations with indi-
viduals that face a positive probability of death and differ with respect to
age considerably reduces agglomeration tendencies between regions. In the
first paper we establish the distributional effects from the turnover of gen-
erations as being responsible for this result. Since a higher capital stock in
one region implies that dying individuals are on average richer, the distribu-
tional effects due to birth and death, i.e. the replacement of older individuals
with higher consumption expenditures by newborns with lower consumption
expenditures, are more severe relative to the region with the lower capital
stock. The implied stronger decrease in expenditures translates into a lower
capital rental rate and therefore constitutes an anti-agglomerative force by
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depressing home capital accumulation. Age-dependent heterogeneity of indi-
viduals is key to this turnover channel that we identify as the main linkage
between demographic structures and agglomeration.
The stabilizing effect of introducing the possibility of birth and death has
an important implication that is also of high relevance from an economic
policy point of view: calibrations of our benchmark model show that for
plausible demographic structures, agglomeration processes do not set in even
if economic integration is promoted up to a high degree. Consequently, there
might not be any trade-off between increased economic integration on the one
hand and equal economic development on the other hand. This is in sharp
contrast to Baldwin (1999) and other NEG approaches and still holds for the
case of nonconstant population size considered in the second paper. Only if
one allows for additional agglomeration forces - as done in the third paper by
introducing knowledge spillovers - spatial concentration of economic activity
is possible even for plausible demographic structures.
In the varying population size framework of paper two, the turnover effect
on agglomeration is augmented by a population growth based channel. As
shown in this second contribution, population growth acts as a dispersion
force. In particular, it weakens the wealth and thus expenditure increase due
to a higher capital stock and therefore the increase in capital rental rates that
would trigger further capital accumulation and favor agglomeration tenden-
cies. Since birth and mortality rates affect population growth differently -
lower birth rates decrease the population growth rate, while lower mortality
rates increase it - their impacts on agglomeration processes are also oppo-
site. For declining fertility rates, the population growth based channel simply
strengthens the pro-agglomerative effects of a lower turnover of generations,
while for declining mortality rates, the implied increase in the population
growth rate counteracts and even dominates the turnover channel. Conse-
quently, population aging as represented by declining fertility strengthens ag-
glomeration processes, whereas declining mortality weakens them. Although
these findings indicate that industrialized countries with rapidly aging so-
cieties and lower population growth rates due to declines in fertility might
be confronted with increased spatial concentration of economic activity, the
5
model’s calibrations suggest that they are still far away from a situation of
catastrophic agglomeration.
The stabilizing effect of the turnover of generations is also found when
additionally allowing for endogenous growth as in the framework of the third
paper. In this case, its anti-agglomerative effects are, however, dampened
by a growth-linked circular causality being present as long as interregional
knowledge spillovers are not perfect. Moreover, the model’s equilibrium dy-
namics4 reveal that lifetime uncertainty has important implications for equi-
librium selection. Higher mortality rates reduce the possibility that expecta-
tions rather than history, represented by initial conditions, are decisive with
respect to the question in which region agglomeration will take place. When
it comes to the effects of demographic structures on economic growth, the
results are twofold. First, lifetime uncertainty is shown to decrease long-run
growth since future is discounted more heavily with positive mortality rates
which depresses investment in future growth prospects. Second, comparing
the negative effect of the mortality rate on equilibrium growth rates in the
symmetric and core-periphery equilibrium shows that, in sharp contrast to
existing NEG growth models with localized knowledge spillovers, spatial ag-
glomeration is not necessarily conducive to growth. In particular, lifetime
uncertainty mitigates the pro-growth effect of agglomeration resulting from
the localized nature of learning effects. This also implies that there might not
be any trade-off between fostering an equal distribution of productive factors
and high economic growth if one takes into account demographic structures.
The structure of the present thesis is as follows. After this motivating
introduction that primarily aims at establishing the relationship between the
three contributions as well as summarizing the contents and main findings of
each paper, chapter 2 contains the first essay that introduces the benchmark
model and identifies the turnover channel as the main linkage between ag-
glomeration and demographic change. The second paper, which incorporates
a more detailed analysis of demographic change by allowing for unequal birth
4Surprisingly, the introduction of endogenous growth into the benchmark model of the
first paper substantially simplifies the dynamic system describing the evolution of the
economy.
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and mortality rates, is contained in chapter 2. Chapter 4 presents the third
paper that additionally extends the benchmark model to allow for endoge-
nous growth. The calculations originally contained in the paper appendices
are finally subsumed in the joint appendix A.
7
 
Chapter 2
Agglomeration and
demographic change1
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, most economies have been confronted with tremendous
structural changes arising from globalization and demographic developments.
Freer trade (see Sachs and Warner (1995)) has led to higher international in-
tegration meaning that goods produced in a certain region can nowadays be
sold all over the world at a more competitive price. As a result, global com-
petition for productive factors has emerged. In particular, firms have started
to invest in regions where productive factors are relatively cheap and ship
their goods to regions populated by consumers with high purchasing power.
Deeper economic integration on the one hand and relocation of manufac-
turing to areas with high rates of return on capital on the other hand thus
constitute two closely related recent economic developments.
At the same time, fertility rates have decreased in nearly all countries
(see Eurostat (2004)) resulting in lower population growth rates and aging
societies (see United Nations (2007)). These demographic developments do
not only change the productivity of labor but also have crucial impacts on de-
mand and saving patterns in the economy which in turn affect the returns of
1Joint work with Klaus Prettner.
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productive factors. As a consequence, economic integration and demographic
change are inseparably linked. Despite this fact, their common economic con-
sequences have barely been analyzed in one single framework up to now. Our
paper makes a first step toward closing the gap by introducing demography
into the New Economic Geography (NEG). We are thus able to describe the
effects of declining transport costs on the location of productive factors in a
setting where individuals face lifetime uncertainty and differ with respect to
age. In particular, our model investigates whether concentration of economic
activity as emphasized by the NEG literature still takes place when allowing
for plausible demographic structures.
The NEG literature pioneered by Krugman (1991b), Venables (1996) and
Krugman and Venables (1995) has provided new insights for the explanation
of the spatial distribution of economic activity. These models are charac-
terized by catastrophic agglomeration meaning that for certain threshold
levels of economic integration, industrial activity completely concentrates in
one region. In particular, circular causality effects between factor rewards
and demands for monopolistically competitive goods encourage agglomera-
tion processes. They destabilize the symmetric equilibrium with an equal
division of productive factors and turn the core-periphery outcome with all
industrial activity taking place in one region into a stable equilibrium. Re-
ciprocal liberalization between initially symmetric regions that strengthens
such circular causality effects thus leads to complete deindustrialization of
one region.
Puga (1999) set up a model that nested as special cases both the Krugman
(1991b) framework with labor mobility between regions as well as the verti-
cally linked-industries model of Venables (1996) and Krugman and Venables
(1995) without interregional labor mobility. However, the richness of agglom-
eration features in these early models reduced their analytical tractability.
Therefore Baldwin (1999) introduced the constructed capital framework with
interregional labor and capital immobility but forward-looking agents who
behave dynamically optimal. His model features catastrophic agglomeration
of capital stocks explained by the difference in the capital rental rates of two
regions. A higher rental rate in the home region causes home capital accu-
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mulation, whereas capital is decumulated in the foreign region. The only
force fostering this agglomeration process is a demand-linked circular causal-
ity effect setting in as a higher capital stock raises capital income and thus
expenditures which leads to a further increase in home rental rates. Since
neoclassical growth models in the spirit of Ramsey (1928) and Solow (1956)
associate capital accumulation with medium-run growth, Baldwin (1999) de-
scribes the economy accumulating capital as a growth pole, whereas the other
region appears as a growth sink. His agglomeration induced growth story
therefore nicely illustrates how economic integration, which strengthens the
demand-linked circular causality, can lead to the development of “rust” and
“boom belts”.
The Ramsey (1928) framework of one single, infinitely lived representative
agent, on which the constructed capital model’s saving features heavily rely,
does not allow to analyze demographic changes. We therefore generalize the
approach of Baldwin (1999) by introducing lifetime uncertainty. In doing so,
we adopt the overlapping generation structure of Blanchard (1985), where
heterogeneity among individuals is due to their date of birth. While still
following the lines of intertemporally optimizing agents, this results in a
more comprehensive model incorporating life-cycle decisions and nesting the
constructed capital set-up as a special case. In particular, it allows us to
reveal in detail the linkage between demography, economic integration and
agglomeration.
Our results show that ignoring the impact of demographic structures on
demand and saving patterns and thus on capital rental rates misses cru-
cial mechanisms that are fundamental for the location of productive factors.
We find that the possibility of the symmetric equilibrium to be unstable is
considerably reduced in a setting with overlapping generations and lifetime
uncertainty. For plausible demographic structures, agglomeration processes
between two regions thus do not set in even if economic integration is pro-
moted up to a high degree. This also implies that the agglomeration induced
growth story of Baldwin (1999) primarily applies in the very special case of
infinitely lived individuals. The explanation for our finding is rooted in the
turnover of generations which acts as an additional dispersion force against
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the concentration of industrial activity. Since a higher capital stock in one
region implies that dying individuals are on average richer, the distributional
effects due to birth and death, i.e. the replacement of older individuals with
higher consumption expenditures by newborns with lower consumption ex-
penditures, are more severe relative to the region with the lower capital stock.
The implied stronger decrease in expenditures translates into a lower capital
rental rate and therefore constitutes an anti-agglomerative force.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the structure of the
model and derives optimal saving behavior and the equilibrium capital rental
rates. Section 2.3 verifies the existence of a symmetric long-run equilibrium
and characterizes its properties with respect to the economies’ demographic
structures, i.e. the mortality rate. Section 2.4 establishes the link between
agglomeration and demographic change. To complement our analytical find-
ings by numerical illustrations we also calibrate the model for reasonable
parameter values. Finally, section 2.5 summarizes and draws conclusions for
economic policy.
2.2 The model
This section describes how we integrate the overlapping generation struc-
ture of Blanchard (1985) into the constructed capital framework of Baldwin
(1999). Consumption and saving behavior as well as production technologies
are introduced and various intermediate results from profit maximization are
presented. Combining these findings will yield aggregate laws of motion for
capital and expenditures that can be used to analyze the long-run equilib-
rium.
2.2.1 Basic structure and underlying assumptions
The model consists of two symmetric regions or countries, referred to as H for
home and F for foreign2, with identical production technologies, preferences
2If further distinction is needed, foreign variables are moreover indicated by an asterisk.
In particular, the superscript F denotes that a good was produced in the foreign region,
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of individuals, labor endowments and demographic structures. Each region
has three economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and investment) with
two immobile factors (labor L and capital K) at their disposal. The homo-
geneous agricultural good, z, is produced in a perfectly competitive market
with labor as the only input and can be traded between the two regions
without any cost. Manufacturing firms are modeled as in the monopolistic
competition framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and therefore produce
varieties, m, with one unit of capital as fixed input and labor as the variable
production factor. Since each variety exactly requires one unit of capital, a
continuum of varieties i ∈ (0, K] is produced at home, while a continuum
of varieties j ∈ (0, K∗] is manufactured in the foreign region. In contrast to
the agricultural good, trade of manufactures involves iceberg transport costs
such that ϕ ≥ 1 units of the differentiated good have to be shipped in order
to sell one unit abroad (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003)). In the Walrasian in-
vestment sector, capital, i.e. machines, are produced using labor as the only
input where wages are paid out of the individuals’ savings. The failure rate
of a machine is assumed to be independent of the machine’s age. Denoting
this failure rate as δ > 0, and using the law of large numbers, implies that a
share δ of the capital stock depreciates at each instant (see Baldwin (1999)).
As far as the demographic structure of our model economy is concerned,
we closely follow the simplified setting of Blanchard (1985). We assume that
at each point in time, τ ∈ [0,∞), a large cohort consisting of new individ-
uals is born. These newborns receive no bequests and thus start their lives
without any wealth. The size of this cohort is N(τ, τ) = µN(τ), where µ > 0
is the constant birth rate and N(τ) ≡ ∫ τ−∞N(t0, τ)dt0 is total population at
time τ with N(t0, τ) denoting the size of the cohort born at t0 for any given
point in time τ .3 Consequently, cohorts can be distinguished by the birth
date t0 of their members. Since there is no heterogeneity between members
of the same cohort, each cohort can be described by one representative in-
dividual, who inelastically supplies her efficiency units of labor on the labor
whereas the asterisk indicates that it is consumed in the foreign region.
3In what follows the first time index of a variable will refer to the birth date, whereas
the second will indicate a certain point in time.
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market with perfect mobility across sectors but immobility between regions.
The age of this individual is given by a = τ − t0 and her time of death is
stochastic with an exponential probability density function. In particular,
the instantaneous mortality rate is also pinned down by the age independent
parameter µ resulting in a survival probability to age τ − t0 of e−µ(τ−t0).
Since population size is large, the frequency of dying is equal to the instanta-
neous mortality rate. Therefore the number of deaths at each point in time
is µN(τ). As this equals, by assumption, the number of births, population
size is constant and can be normalized to one.4 Finally, as in Yaari (1965),
a perfect life-insurance company offers actuarial notes, which can be bought
or sold by each individual and are canceled upon the individual’s death.
2.2.2 Individual utility optimization
Preferences over the agricultural good and a CES composite of the manufac-
turing varieties are Cobb-Douglas.5 The representative individual of cohort t0
chooses at each instant τ > t0 consumption of the agricultural good, cz(t0, τ),
consumption of varieties produced at home, cHm(i, t0, τ), and consumption of
varieties produced abroad, cFm(j, t0, τ), to maximize her expected lifetime
utility at time t0
6
U(t0, t0) =
∫ ∞
t0
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t0) ln
[
(cz(t0, τ))
1−ξ(caggm (t0, τ))
ξ
]
dτ, (2.1)
4From now on, we will refer to µ as the mortality rate. Note, however, that µ equiv-
alently represents the birth rate, e.g. demographic change as captured by variations in µ
means that both the mortality and the birth rate change by the same amount such that
population size remains constant. This also implies that we restrict attention to changes
in the population age structure (lower µ implies population aging) while neglecting varia-
tions in the population growth rate due to demographic change. In particular, emphasis is
put on comparing a situation that fully ignores demographic structures, i.e. where µ = 0,
to one that allows for them by considering nonzero mortality rates.
5The following discussion refers to the home region but due to symmetry, equivalent
equations also hold in the foreign region.
6Equation (2.1) can be easily derived by calculating expected lifetime utility where
the date of death is a random variable with an exponential probability density function
parameterized by a constant instantaneous mortality rate µ.
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where ρ > 0 is the pure rate of time preference, 0 < ξ < 1 is the manufac-
turing share of consumption and
caggm (t0, τ) ≡
[∫ K(τ)
0
(
cHm(i, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(
cFm(j, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
represents consumption of the CES composite with σ > 1 denoting the elas-
ticity of substitution between varieties.
Individual savings, defined as income minus consumption expenditures,
are converted into capital in the investment sector with a time independent,
exogenous labor input coefficient of ai. The wealth constraint of a represen-
tative individual can be thus written as
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
+ µk(t0, τ)− δk(t0, τ), (2.2)
where w(τ) denotes the wage per efficiency unit of labor, l refers to the
efficiency units of labor an individual supplies, pi(τ) is the capital rental
rate, k(t0, τ) the individual capital stock and e(t0, τ) are individual total
expenditures for consumption defined as
e(t0, τ) ≡ pz(τ)cz(t0, τ) +
∫ K(τ)
0
pHm(i, τ)c
H
m(i, t0, τ)di+∫ K∗(τ)
0
pFm,ϕ(j, τ)c
F
m(j, t0, τ)dj.
Here pz(τ) is the price of the agricultural good, p
H
m(i, τ) the price of a manu-
factured variety produced at home and pFm,ϕ(j, τ) the price of a manufactured
variety produced abroad with the subscript ϕ indicating the dependence on
transport costs.
The particular law of motion for capital given in equation (2.2) is based
on the full insurance result of Yaari (1965) implying that all individuals only
hold their wealth in the form of actuarial notes.7 Therefore the market rate
7Two interpretations of the capital accumulation process are therefore possible. Either
each individual itself converts her savings into capital and then leaves it to the insurance
company or savings are immediately transferred to the insurance company which converts
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of return on capital, pi(τ)
w(τ)ai
− δ, has to be augmented by µ to obtain the fair
rate on actuarial notes (see Yaari (1965)).
In appendix A.1.1 we solve the individual’s utility optimization problem
by applying a three stage procedure. In the first stage the dynamic savings-
expenditure decision is analyzed. Stage two deals with the static optimal con-
sumption allocation between the CES composite and the agricultural good
and in stage three individuals decide upon the amount of consumption they
allocate to each of the manufactured varieties. Altogether this leads to the
following demand functions for the agricultural good and for each of the
manufactured varieties
cz(t0, τ) =
(1− ξ)e(t0, τ)
pz(τ)
, (2.3)
cHm(i, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(p
H
m(i, τ))
−σ[∫ K(τ)
0
(pHm(i, τ))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
1−σdj
] , (2.4)
cFm(j, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))
−σ[∫ K(τ)
0
(pHm(i, τ))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
1−σdj
] (2.5)
as well as to the consumption Euler equation for the representative individual
of cohort t0
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
aiw(τ)
− δ − ρ. (2.6)
As first shown by Yaari (1965), the representative individual’s Euler equation
with fully insured lifetime uncertainty is identical to the Euler equation when
no lifetime uncertainty exists, i.e. individual saving behavior is not influenced
by the mortality rate and moreover does not differ across generations.
2.2.3 Aggregate expenditures and capital
Due to the overlapping generation structure our model setup does not feature
one single representative individual. In order to be able to analyze the long-
run equilibrium of the economy as well as its stability properties it is therefore
necessary to derive the aggregate laws of motion of capital and consumption
them into machines by employing workers.
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expenditures. The capital stock of the economy at a certain point in time
t can be obtained by aggregating up the capital stocks of all cohorts. An
analogous definition applies to consumption expenditures. These aggregation
rules are formally given by
K(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0, (2.7)
E(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0, (2.8)
where K(t) is the aggregate capital stock and E(t) denotes aggregate con-
sumption expenditures.8 Equivalent equations hold for the foreign region.
Using the demographic assumptions described in section 2.2.1, we can
exactly trace the size N(t0, t) of any particular cohort over time. A cohort
born at time t0 is of size µe
−µ(t−t0) at time t ≥ t0 as the probability of
surviving to time t equals e−µ(t−t0) and the initial size of the cohort is µ.
Substituting for N(t0, t) in equation (2.8) therefore yields
E(t) ≡ µ
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)e
−µ(t−t0)dt0. (2.9)
The “aggregate Euler equation”, modified for the existence of overlapping
generations and lifetime uncertainty, directly follows from equation (2.9) by
differentiating it with respect to t and then substituting for e˙(t0, t) from the
individual Euler equation (2.6) and for e(t, t) and E(t) from the correspond-
ing expressions derived in appendix A.1.2 where we describe the various
aggregation steps in detail.9 It is given by
E˙(t)
E(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− ρ− δ (2.10)
= −µE(t)− e(t, t)
E(t)
+
e˙(t0, t)
e(t0, t)
. (2.11)
8The aggregate efficiency units of labor L are equal to the individual supply l since
population size is normalized to one.
9Those aggregation steps closely follow the ones described by Heijdra and van der Ploeg
(2002) in chapter 16.
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In sharp contrast to the individual Euler equation, the mortality rate plays
a prominent role in the aggregate Euler equation. From equation (2.11) it
follows that the difference between individual and aggregate saving behavior
is captured by a correction term representing the distributional effects due to
the turnover of generations (see Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002), chapter
16). Optimal consumption expenditure growth is the same for all generations
(see equation (2.6)) but optimal expenditure levels differ. In particular, al-
lowing for lifetime uncertainty introduces heterogeneity among individuals
with respect to their birth dates and, since wealth and consumption levels
are age-dependent, also with respect to their expenditures. As shown in ap-
pendix A.1.2, optimal consumption expenditures e(t0, t) are proportional to
total wealth with the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth
being equal to the “effective” rate of time preference ρ+µ. Older individ-
uals are wealthier due to their accumulated capital holdings and therefore
have higher consumption expenditure levels than their younger counterparts.
Since dying old generations are replaced by newborns with no capital holdings
at each point in time, aggregate consumption expenditure growth is smaller
than individual consumption expenditure growth. The correction term on
the right hand side of equation (2.10) therefore describes the difference be-
tween average consumption expenditures10 and consumption expenditures
by newborns as shown in equation (2.11). Since it increases in µ, a higher
mortality rate decreases aggregate consumption expenditure growth. This
is intuitively clear as a higher µ implies a higher generational turnover and
therefore a more pronounced (negative) distributional impact. In the case of
an infinitely lived representative individual, i.e. µ = 0, the turnover effect
completely disappears. Since the mortality rate enters the aggregate Euler
equation and thus influences aggregate saving patterns only via this turnover
correction term, it is not surprising that these distributional effects due to
birth and death will play a crucial role when it comes to investigating the
linkage between demographic change and the forces fostering or weakening
agglomeration in our model.
10Since we normalized population size to one, aggregate consumption expenditures E(t)
are equal to average consumption expenditures.
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Similarly, the aggregate law of motion for the capital stock can be ob-
tained. Rewriting equation (2.7) in analogy to equation (2.9) and then dif-
ferentiating it with respect to t yields
K˙(t) =
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
]
K(t) +
w(t)L
w(t)ai
− E(t)
w(t)ai
, (2.12)
where we applied the same steps as in the derivation for the aggregate Euler
equation shown in appendix A.1.2.11 Compared to the law of motion for in-
dividual capital, there appears no term featuring the mortality rate µ. This
captures the fact that µK(t) does not represent aggregate capital accumu-
lation but is a transfer - via the life insurance company - from individuals
who died to those who survived. As a consequence, aggregate capital accu-
mulates at a rate pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ, whereas capital of surviving individuals attracts
the actuarial interest rate pi(t)
w(t)ai
+µ− δ for surviving individuals (see Heijdra
and van der Ploeg (2002), chapter 16).
Summarizing, the mortality rate µ enters the law of motion for the in-
dividual capital stock but disappears in the corresponding aggregate law of
motion. This is in sharp contrast to the Euler equation, where µ does not
show up at the individual level but is part of the aggregate consumption
expenditure growth rate.
2.2.4 Production technology and profit maximization
Profit maximization in the manufacturing and agricultural sector closely fol-
lows Baldwin (1999) and yields various intermediate results that simplify the
subsequent analysis of the long-run equilibrium. In particular, the way the
manufacturing sector is modeled allows us to derive the rental rate of capital
as a function of home and foreign capital stocks and expenditures.
Agricultural sector
The homogeneous agricultural good, which can be interpreted as food, is
produced according to the following constant returns to scale production
11In particular, we substituted for k˙(t0, t) from equation (2.2).
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function
Yz(t) =
1
az
Lz(t), (2.13)
where Yz(t) denotes output of the agricultural sector, Lz(t) represents ag-
gregate labor devoted to agricultural production, and az is the unit input
coefficient in the production of agricultural goods. Profit maximization un-
der perfect competition results in marginal cost pricing. Moreover, by choice
of units for agricultural output, az can be set to one implying that the wage
rate equals the price of the agricultural good
pz(t) = wz(t). (2.14)
Since labor is perfectly mobile across sectors the wage rate in the economy
w(t) satisfies
w(t) = wz(t) = wm(t) = wi(t), (2.15)
where wz(t), wm(t) and wi(t) denote wages in the agricultural, manufacturing
and investment sector. Therefore equation (2.14) pins down the equilibrium
wage in the economy. As free trade of the agricultural good between home
and foreign equalizes its price, wages are also equalized between the two
regions as long as each of them produces some Yz(t). This can be shown
to hold if ξ, the manufacturing share of consumption, is not too large (see
Baldwin (1999)) which will be assumed from now on. Finally, choosing the
agricultural good as nume´raire leads to
w(t) = w∗(t) = 1. (2.16)
Manufacturing sector
Each firm in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistically competitive man-
ufacturing sector produces a different output variety using labor as variable
and one variety-specific machine as fixed input. This machine originates from
the investment sector and is equivalent to one unit of capital. Due to the
fixed costs, firms face an increasing returns to scale production technology
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with an associated cost function
pi(t) + w(t)amYm(i, t), (2.17)
where am is the unit input coefficient for efficiency units of labor, Ym(i, t) is
total output of one manufacturing good producer and the capital rental rate
pi(t) represents the fixed cost.
Defining12 Pm(t) ≡
∫ K(t)
0
(pHm(i, t))
1−σdi +
∫ K∗(t)
0
(pFm,ϕ(j, t))
1−σdj as well
as P ∗m(t) ≡
∫ K∗(t)
0
(pHm(j, t))
1−σdj+
∫ K(t)
0
(pFm,ϕ(i, t))
1−σdi and recognizing that
each individual firm has mass zero and hence does not influence these price
indexes, leads to the following maximization problem13 for each firm at time
t
max
pHm,p
F
m,ϕ
(pHm(i, t)− w(t)am)
(∫ t
−∞
cHm(i, t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0
)
+(pFm,ϕ(i, t)− w(t)ϕam)
(∫ t
−∞
cH∗m (i, t0, t)N
∗(t0, t)dt0
)
s.t. cHm(i, t0, t) =
ξe(t0, t)(p
H
m(i, t))
−σ
Pm(t)
cH∗m (i, t0, t) =
ξe∗(t0, t)(pFm,ϕ(i, t))
−σ
P ∗m(t)
. (2.18)
Carrying out the associated calculations shown in appendix A.1.3 gives op-
timal prices
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)am, (2.19)
pFm,ϕ(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)amϕ. (2.20)
The profit maximization problem yields the familiar rule that prices are equal
12Note that pHm(j, t) = p
∗F
m (j, t) and p
F
m,ϕ(i, t) = p
∗H
m,ϕ(i, t) due to symmetry between
the two regions, where p∗Hm,ϕ(i, t) is the price of a good produced in the home economy but
consumed in the foreign region.
13We ignore fixed costs in the derivations here as they do not influence the first order
conditions. Therefore we just maximize operating profit defined as revenues from selling
the variety to the home and foreign region minus variable production costs (taking into
account the effect of transport costs).
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to a constant markup over marginal costs which decreases in σ since a higher
elasticity of substitution reduces the market power of manufacturing firms.
Moreover, mill pricing is optimal, i.e. the only difference between prices in
the two regions is due to transport costs (see Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Since we have variety specificity of capital and free entry into the manu-
facturing sector driving pure profits down to zero, the capital rental rate is
equivalent to the Ricardian surplus, i.e. the operating profit of each man-
ufacturing firm. In particular, the insurance companies, which hold all the
capital due to the full insurance result (see section 2.2.2), rent their cap-
ital holdings to the manufacturing firms and can fully extract all profits.
As shown in appendix A.1.3, using optimal prices given in equations (2.19)
and (2.20) and redefining global quantities and regional share variables gives
operating profits and thus capital rental rates as14
pi =
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias
(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (2.21)
pi∗ =
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bias∗
(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (2.22)
where φ ≡ ϕ1−σ is a measure of openness between the two regions with
φ = 0 indicating prohibitive trade barriers and φ = 1 free trade. World
expenditures are defined as EW ≡ E + E∗ and the world capital stock as
KW ≡ K + K∗ with θK and θE being the respective home shares of these
quantities, i.e. θK ≡ KK+K∗ and θE ≡ EE+E∗ .
As expected, these rental rates are identical to those derived in the con-
structed capital model of Baldwin (1999), since the introduction of overlap-
ping generations and lifetime uncertainty does not change the production
side of the economy. In analogy to Baldwin (1999), the terms labeled Bias
and Bias∗ can be interpreted as the bias in national sales, i.e. Bias mea-
sures the extent to which a home variety’s sales (σpi) differ from the world
14We ignore time arguments here. Note, moreover, that ξ = ξ∗ and σ = σ∗ due to
symmetry between regions.
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average sales per variety ( ξE
W
KW
). In the symmetric case with θK = 1/2 and
θE = 1/2, Bias = Bias
∗ = 1 implying that operating profits of each man-
ufacturing firm are given by ξE
W
σKW
, a result familiar from the monopolistic
competition framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Additionally, Bias and
Bias∗ capture the impact of capital and expenditure shifting on profits.15 At
the symmetric equilibrium, shifting expenditure to home (dθE > 0) raises pi
and lowers pi∗ since it increases the home market size. A higher expenditure
share therefore supports agglomeration of capital at home since capital accu-
mulates where the rental rate is higher and decumulates in the other region.
Production shifting16 to home (dθK > 0), on the other hand, has the opposite
impact as it increases competition in the home market. Both forces are cru-
cial for explaining agglomeration processes in the constructed capital model
of Baldwin (1999). In particular, suppose the two regions are in a symmetric
equilibrium and capital stocks are slightly perturbed. If this perturbation
raises the relative profitability in the region with the increased capital share
then the equilibrium is unstable and agglomeration sets in. Whether catas-
trophic agglomeration of capital occurs is thus determined by the relative
strength of the two effects described above. The local competition effect di-
rectly decreases the capital rental rate, whereas the higher expenditure share
associated with a higher capital share indirectly increases the rate. This last
channel is based on the demand-linked circular causality, i.e. a higher capi-
tal stock implies a higher income which increases expenditures and thus the
capital rental rate. As both the pro-agglomerative expenditure shifting and
the anti-agglomerative production shifting effect depend on the level of trade
openness φ, the link between economic integration and agglomeration can be
easily established. In this respect Baldwin (1999) shows that, when starting
from a situation of prohibitive trade costs, agglomeration processes set in as
soon as economic integration reaches a certain threshold level. The crucial
question to be investigated in the following sections is whether and how such
15As capital is immobile between regions, the term capital shifting might be misleading.
It should, however, only represent an exogenous perturbation of the home capital share
(and similarly of the home expenditure share in the case of expenditure shifting).
16Recall that the number of varieties in the home region is equal to the capital stock at
home. This implies that capital accumulation is tantamount to firm creation.
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agglomerative tendencies depend on the regions’ demographic structures.
2.3 Long-run equilibrium
The dynamics of this neoclassical growth model with overlapping generations
are fully described by the following four dimensional system in the variables
E, E∗, K and K∗ whose equations were derived in section 2.2.3 and are given
by17
K˙ =
[
ξ
σai
(
E
K + φK∗
+
φE∗
φK +K∗
)
− δ
]
K +
L
ai
− E
ai
, (2.23)
E˙ = −µ(ρ+ µ)aiK + E
[
ξ
σai
(
E
K + φK∗
+
φE∗
φK +K∗
)
− ρ− δ
]
,
(2.24)
K˙∗ =
[
ξ
σai
(
E∗
K∗ + φK
+
φE
φK∗ +K
)
− δ
]
K∗ +
L
ai
− E
∗
ai
, (2.25)
E˙∗ = −µ(ρ+ µ)aiK∗ + E∗
[
ξ
σai
(
E∗
K∗ + φK
+
φE
φK∗ +K
)
− ρ− δ
]
.
(2.26)
Here we used that the equilibrium wage rate is equal to one in both regions
and we already substituted for the rental rates from equations (2.21) and
(2.22).18 The mortality rate enters the system only via the turnover correc-
tion terms in the aggregate Euler equations. This again emphasizes that the
effects of demographic change on the model’s dynamics will crucially hinge
on the heterogeneity of wealth and therefore expenditure levels with respect
to age. Moreover, setting µ = 0, i.e. considering the case of an infinitely lived
representative agent and thus ignoring any demographic structures, reduces
the law of motions to the ones obtained by Baldwin (1999). Our framework
thus nests the constructed capital model as a special case.
A long-run equilibrium characterized by the steady-state values E¯, K¯, E¯∗
17We again suppress time arguments here.
18Note that we rewrote the rental rates as functions of the variables E, E∗, K and K∗
and that, due to the assumption of symmetric regions, we have L = L∗ and µ = µ∗ as
well as ai = a∗i , δ = δ
∗ and ρ = ρ∗.
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and K¯∗ must fulfill the system with the left hand side set equal to zero. It
can be verified19 that the symmetric outcome with K = K∗ and E = E∗ has
this property with the steady-state values given by20
E¯sym =
Lσ
(
σδ2 + ρσδ − 2µ(µ+ ρ)(σ − ξ) + δ√σ√σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ)
2(δσ + (µ+ ρ)(σ − ξ))(δσ + µ(ξ − σ)) ,
(2.27)
K¯sym =
δLσ(σ + ξ) + L
√
σ(σ − ξ)
(
ρ
√
σ −√σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ)
2ai(δσ + (µ+ ρ)(σ − ξ))(δσ + µ(ξ − σ)) .
(2.28)
Investigating how these steady-state values depend on the mortality rate
helps to develop a deeper understanding of the various ways the introduction
of overlapping generations and lifetime uncertainty impacts upon the model’s
behavior. There are two possible channels via which demographic change, as
captured by variations in the mortality rate, can influence the steady-state
value of aggregate consumption expenditures. On the one hand, a higher
mortality rate changes the age structure of the population by increasing the
proportion of poor and young to wealthy and old individuals. As the former
have lower expenditure levels, this first channel, which basically captures
the effects of an increased generational turnover, indicates a negative depen-
dence of equilibrium expenditures upon the mortality rate (“age structure
based channel”). On the other hand, a higher mortality rate influences de-
mand patterns of individuals across all generations uniformly by increasing
their effective rate of time preference ρ+µ and thus their marginal propensity
to consume out of total wealth (see section 2.2.3). According to this second
channel, a higher mortality rate positively affects consumption expenditures
since an increased probability of death resulting in a more heavy discounting
of the future increases expenditure levels of all individuals (“discount chan-
19These and most other results were derived with Mathematica. The corresponding files
are available from the authors upon request.
20Solving the system for the symmetric equilibrium values in fact yielded two solution
pairs. As one of them gives negative equilibrium expenditures for plausible parameter
values we restrict our attention to the economically meaningful solution pair.
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nel”). We can therefore conclude that the mortality rate’s effect on aggregate
consumption expenditures is a priori ambiguous since it crucially depends on
which of the two effects dominates.
However, as far as the aggregate equilibrium capital stock is concerned,
both channels imply a negative dependence. First, a higher mortality rate
decreases the proportion of old individuals with high capital stocks which
reduces the aggregate capital stock. Second, it increases discounting which
depresses savings and thus capital accumulation of all individuals.
To clarify the above arguing, we investigate the derivatives of E¯sym and
K¯sym with respect to µ. As the corresponding signs are analytically ambigu-
ous, we resort to numerical analysis by calibrating our model and evaluating
the derivatives at the following plausible parameter values: µ = 0.0125 re-
sulting in a life expectancy of 80 years21, δ = 0.05 implying that capital fully
depreciates on average after 20 years, ρ = 0.015 (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987)), ai = 2 by choice of units for the investment good and L = 1. Since
there is considerable disagreement about the parameter values of σ and ξ,
we use a wide range in our numerical calculations. As far as the former is
concerned, a plausible lower bound is σ = 2 as in Baldwin (1999). Most
authors, however, use σ ≈ 4 (see Krugman (1991b), Krugman and Venables
(1995), Martin and Ottaviano (1999), Puga (1999), Brakman et al. (2005)
and Bosker and Garretsen (2007)). In order to consider all reasonable pos-
sibilities, we choose as an upper bound σ = 8. With respect to ξ, which in
fact describes the share of consumption expenditures for the good produced
under increasing returns to scale (relative to the good produced under con-
stant returns to scale), Puga (1999), Head and Mayer (2003) and Bosker and
Garretsen (2007) consider a value of ξ = 0.1, Krugman (1991b) and Bald-
win (1999) set ξ = 0.3, Krugman and Venables (1995) choose ξ = 0.6 and
Martin and Ottaviano (1999) set ξ = 0.8. We therefore consider a possible
parameter range of 0.1 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.9 to account for this wide spread.22
Figure 2.1 and 2.2 reveal that for these parameter ranges the derivative
21Since the probability of death during each year equals µ, average life expectancy is 1µ .
22Recall, however, that production of the agricultural good in both regions requires ξ
to be sufficiently small (see section 2.2.4).
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Figure 2.1: Derivative of E¯sym with respect to µ
of E¯sym with respect to µ is positive, whereas the derivative of K¯sym is nega-
tive.23 Consequently, a decrease in the mortality rate increases the aggregate
equilibrium capital stock and decreases aggregate equilibrium expenditures.
We can thus conclude that demographic change influences expenditures pri-
marily via the effect on discounting. The discount channel dominates the age
structure channel which captures the effects of variations in µ on the age com-
position of the population and thus exerts its influence via the heterogeneity
of expenditure and wealth levels with respect to age. The positive depen-
dence of aggregate equilibrium expenditures on the mortality rate is fully
consistent with the life-cycle savings literature claiming that longer planning
horizons, i.e. lower mortality rates, lead to higher individual savings and
lower consumption levels (see e.g. Gertler (1999), Futagami and Nakajima
(2001) or Zhang et al. (2003)).
As it turns out, when considering the impact of the mortality rate on
23We also investigated the derivatives for varying mortality rates. Assuming 0.008 ≤
µ ≤ 0.025 resulting in a life expectancy between 40 and 120 years, and still considering
the same values for the other parameters, does not change our findings.
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Figure 2.2: Derivative of K¯sym with respect to µ
the steady-state consumption expenditure share24, E¯sym
δK¯sym+E¯sym
, even analyt-
ical results can be derived. This share is obtainable from the ratio of the
equilibrium capital stock to equilibrium expenditures25
K¯sym
E¯sym
=
2ξ
ai(δσ + ρσ +
√
σ
√
σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ)
, (2.29)
which obviously depends negatively on the mortality rate. Consistent with
our numerical findings, a higher mortality rate thus increases the steady-state
consumption expenditure share which again supports the predominant role
of the discount channel.
24This share is defined as equilibrium consumption expenditures divided by steady-state
income, where steady-state income is the sum of replacement investment, δK (equal to
savings in steady state), and consumption expenditures.
25Simply calculate 1δK¯sym
E¯sym
+1
.
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2.4 Symmetric equilibrium stability -
Agglomeration and demographic change
NEG models emphasize that reciprocal liberalization between initially sym-
metric regions leads to catastrophic agglomeration, i.e. their main focus is
on the instability of the symmetric equilibrium. Indeed, if this steady state
is unstable, then any slight perturbation will lead us away from an equal
distribution of capital and expenditures and thus result in agglomeration
processes. In this section we show that the introduction of overlapping gen-
erations and lifetime uncertainty considerably reduces the possibility of the
symmetric equilibrium to be unstable. As a consequence, agglomeration of
economic activity may not set in even if economic integration is promoted
up to a high degree.
2.4.1 Formal stability analysis
The stability properties of the symmetric long-run equilibrium for varying
levels of trade openness and mortality rates are analyzed by following the
classical approach (see e.g. the appendix on mathematical methods in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004)) of linearizing the non-linear dynamic system given
in equations (2.23), (2.24), (2.25) and (2.26) around the symmetric equi-
librium and then by evaluating the eigenvalues of the corresponding 4 × 4
Jacobian matrix
Jsym =
(
J1 J2
J3 J4
)
, (2.30)
where the four symmetric 2× 2 sub-matrices Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4 are given in
appendix A.1.4. Solving the characteristic equation yields the following four
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eigenvalues
eig1 =
1
2
(r1 −
√
rad1), (2.31)
eig2 =
1
2
(r1 +
√
rad1), (2.32)
eig3 =
1
2(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(r2 −
√
rad2), (2.33)
eig4 =
1
2(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(r2 +
√
rad2), (2.34)
where
r1 ≡ A√
σ
− δ,
rad1 ≡
(
A√
σ
+ δ
)2
+
(σ − ξ)
(
(A+B)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ
)
σξ
,
r2 ≡ 3φA+A−
√
σ
(
δ
(
2φ2 + φ+ 1
)
+ (φ− 1)φρ) ,
rad2 ≡
(
A(φ− 1) + (δ(φ− 1) + φ(φ+ 3)ρ)√σ)2 +
(φ+ 1)(φσ + σ + φξ − ξ) ((A+B)2(φ− 1)2 + 4µ(φ+ 1)2(µ+ ρ)ξ)
ξ
,
with the parameter clusters A ≡ √σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ as well as B ≡
(δ + ρ)
√
σ. The signs and nature of these eigenvalues fully characterize the
system’s local dynamics around the symmetric equilibrium. Analytically
investigating them26 thus results in lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. Eigenvalue 3 is decisive for the local stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium. A positive eigenvalue 3 implies instability, a negative
one saddle path stability.
Proof. By investigating the expressions for the eigenvalues it is first easily
established that all of them are real. This holds since both rad1 and rad2 are
nonnegative for all possible parameter values (in particular since σ > ξ).27
26In order to get a first idea about the signs and nature of the eigenvalues, we also
calibrated the model and investigated the eigenvalues numerically. The corresponding
findings are presented in appendix A.1.4.
27Recall the parameter ranges σ > 1, δ > 0, ρ > 0, µ > 0, 0 < ξ < 1 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
which imply that A > 0 and B > 0.
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Convergence to or divergence from the symmetric equilibrium is therefore
monotonic.
As there are two jump variables E and E∗, saddle path stability prevails if
and only if there are two negative eigenvalues. If fewer than two eigenvalues
are negative, the system is locally unstable. By inserting the expression
for A, it turns out that r1 > 0. We can thus immediately conclude that
eigenvalue 2 is positive. In order to find out the sign of eigenvalue 1, we
compare r1 with the corresponding part under the radical, i.e. rad1. The
square of the former is smaller than the latter, implying that eigenvalue 1 is
always negative. It remains to investigate the signs of eigenvalues 3 and 4.
Again we first check whether r2 is nonnegative. By inserting the expression
for A, r2 can be rewritten as
r2 = −
√
σδ
(
2φ2 + φ+ 1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
term1
+
√
σ(1− φ)φρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
term2
+
(1 + 3φ)
√
σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ︸ ︷︷ ︸
term3
.
All three terms are increasing in ρ, ξ and µ but react differently to changes
in φ, δ and σ. In order to show that r2 is nevertheless nonnegative for all
parameter values we set ρ, ξ and µ equal to zero resulting in the “worst”,
i.e. most negative, outcome with respect to these parameters. Since even in
this case it is easily established that r2 is nonnegative for the whole feasible
parameter space the fourth eigenvalue is definitely positive. Summarizing, we
have shown that eigenvalue 2 and 4 are always positive, whereas eigenvalue
1 is always negative. This proves the crucial role of the third eigenvalue as
claimed in lemma 2.1.
Having demonstrated that changes in the parameter values, and in par-
ticular of the mortality rate, can only influence the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium via eigenvalue 3, it is immediate to investigate this
eigenvalue more thoroughly. Figure 2.3 plots eigenvalue 3 as a function of
φ for three different mortality rates given our choice of the most plausible
values of the other parameters (ρ = 0.015, δ = 0.05, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4). The
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Figure 2.3: Eigenvalue 3 as a function of φ for µ = 0 (dashed line), µ = 0.0002
(solid line) and µ = 0.0004 (dotted line)
graph indicates that, depending on the level of trade openness, eigenvalue 3
switches its sign.28 Moreover, it is clearly visible that the range of φ within
which eigenvalue 3 is positive, crucially depends on the mortality rate. This
observation is investigated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The sign of eigenvalue 3 and hence the stability properties
of the symmetric equilibrium depend on the mortality rate.
Proof. To prove this proposition, we use the concept of the critical level of
trade openness φbreak. This threshold value identifies the degree of economic
integration where eigenvalue 3 changes its sign and therefore where the sta-
bility properties of the symmetric equilibrium change (i.e. where eigenvalue
3 crosses the horizontal axis in figure 2.3). To analytically obtain φbreak, we
set the expression for the third eigenvalue equal to zero and solve the result-
ing equation. This yields two solutions for φbreak as functions of the other
parameters.29 Since these two critical levels in particular also depend on the
28The numerical investigation of eigenvalue 3 in appendix A.1.4 also reveals that it is
impossible to come up with a definite sign for the whole parameter space.
29As the expressions are rather cumbersome they are not presented here but available
upon request.
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mortality rate (see again figure 2.3 for a graphical illustration), proposition
2.1 holds.
So far, we have shown that changes in the mortality rate influence the
stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium. Figure 2.3 moreover al-
ready indicates the particular direction of the impact by illustrating that
eigenvalue 3 decreases in the mortality rate. The next section is dedicated to
investigating this relationship between demographic change and the stability
properties of the symmetric equilibrium in more detail.
2.4.2 The impact of demography on agglomeration
The effects of demographic change on agglomeration can be best understood
by investigating eigenvalue 3 for varying levels of trade openness and mortal-
ity rates. Figure 2.4 plotting the contour lines of eigenvalue 3 for varying µ
and φ given our choice of the most plausible values of the other parameters
(ρ = 0.015, δ = 0.05, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4) illustrates that there only exists
a very small range of combinations of µ and φ where the sign of the third
eigenvalue is positive. This instability region is characterized by parameter
combinations inside the zero contour line which yield a nonnegative eigen-
value 3. A higher mortality rate decreases eigenvalue 3 rather quickly for all
levels of trade openness. Only in case of a(n) (implausibly) low mortality rate
it is possible to find critical values of openness within which the symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable and agglomeration processes can set in. We
can therefore conclude that the introduction of overlapping generations and
lifetime uncertainty, i.e. increasing µ above zero, profoundly reduces agglom-
eration tendencies. In particular, a higher mortality rate implies a smaller
instability region with respect to the level of economic integration and thus
increasingly prevents the two regions from unequal development. The “small-
ness” of the instability region30 moreover implies that, in sharp contrast to
other NEG frameworks and in particular to the catastrophic agglomeration
30Note that we plot this figure only for µ ≤ 0.005 and φ ≥ 0.85 which indicates how
small the instability region relative to the whole parameter range is.
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Figure 2.4: Contour plot of eigenvalue 3
result of Baldwin (1999), our model predicts the symmetric outcome to be
predominant even in the presence of high economic integration.
The effects of demographic change on agglomeration are confirmed by
investigating how the critical levels of trade openness react to changes in
the mortality rate. With an infinitely lived representative individual, i.e.
µ = 0, and again applying our choice of the most plausible parameter val-
ues, the two critical levels of trade openness are φbreak1 = 0.965974 and
φbreak2 = 1.
31 In between those values, i.e. for sufficiently low levels of trade
costs, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable and agglomeration processes in-
deed set in. Allowing µ to increase, however, shows that φbreak1 increases,
while φbreak2 decreases. The range of trade openness levels within which the
symmetric equilibrium is unstable clearly shrinks (in figure 2.3 this shrinkage
31When calibrating our model with the parameter values assumed by Baldwin (1999),
i.e. ρ = δ = 0.1, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 2, the two critical levels of trade openness exactly coincide
with the ones of Baldwin (1999) and are given by φbreak1 = 0.860465 and φbreak2 = 1.
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Figure 2.5: φbreak1 (dashed) and φbreak2 (solid) as a function of µ
is equivalently represented by the downward shift of eigenvalue 3). Figure
2.5 illustrates this finding by plotting the the two critical levels of trade
openness for varying mortality rates as boundaries of the shaded instability
region. In particular, we can establish that for µ > 0.00028, corresponding
to a life expectancy of less than approximately 3500 years, there exists no
level of trade openness such that the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (i.e.
the downward shift in figure 2.3 is such that eigenvalue 3 does not cross the
horizontal axis anymore where it would become positive).32 Assuming rea-
sonable values of the mortality rate therefore implies that, again in sharp
contrast to other NEG models, deeper economic integration does not result
in agglomeration processes. We can thus also conclude that the agglomera-
tion induced growth finding of Baldwin (1999) primarily applies in the very
special case of infinitely lived individuals.
Figure 2.5 does not only show that the instability region shrinks in the
mortality rate but also reveals an interesting feature of the instability set
32We also performed these simulations with respect to the critical level of trade openness
for other parameter ranges, in particular for the parameter choice ρ = δ = 0.1, ξ = 0.3 and
σ = 2 made by Baldwin (1999). In this case the symmetric equilibrium is always stable
for µ > 0.00395. This implies that in the setup of Baldwin (1999) a life expectancy of less
than approximately 250 years prevents any agglomerative tendencies.
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with respect to the level of trade openness: for low but positive mortality
rates, the instability set is non-monotone in φ implying that agglomeration
processes only set in for an intermediate range of trade openness and that
the symmetric equilibrium gets stable again for sufficiently high levels of
economic integration. This is reflected by φbreak2 being smaller than one
which contrasts with the set-up of Baldwin (1999) where φbreak2 is always
equal to one and the symmetric equilibrium is thus unstable for all values of
φ beyond φbreak1 (see figure 2.5 for µ=0).
33 The reason for this distinctive
feature of the instability region becomes clear when looking at the forces
weakening or fostering agglomeration in our model. As it turns out, these
informal stability considerations presented in the next subsection will more-
over be useful for developing some economic intuition about the relationship
between demographic change and agglomeration, i.e. for understanding the
channel through which demography impacts upon the stability properties of
the symmetric equilibrium.
2.4.3 Economic intuition - The turnover effect
As shown by Baldwin (1999), the formal stability analysis pursued in section
2.4.1 yields the same results as a more informal way of checking the stability
of the symmetric equilibrium. This informal way is based on investigating
how an exogenous perturbation of the home share of capital, θK , influences
the profitability of home-based firms relative to foreign-based firms. A posi-
tive impact implies instability as even more firms would locate in the home
region, i.e. capital accumulation would set in.
We can isolate three channels via which production shifting influences the
relative profitability of home-based firms. First, there is the pro-agglomerative
demand-linked circular causality effect. A higher capital share increases capi-
tal income in the home region and thus its expenditure share. The associated
increased market size positively affects home profitability (see section 2.2.4)
and therefore causes further production shifting.34 The second channel is
33Figure 2.3 also illustrates that eigenvalue 3 is positive for all φ > φbreak1 in the case
of µ = 0.
34This agglomeration force first introduced by Baldwin (1999) is due to the endogeneity
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based on the anti-agglomerative local competition effect capturing the nega-
tive impact of production shifting upon equilibrium profits due to the more
severe competition among home-based firms (see again section 2.2.4). Both
these forces are present in the constructed capital model of Baldwin (1999)
and explain why agglomeration in this framework sets in for sufficiently high
levels of economic integration.
In our model, there appears, however, an additional dispersion force
strengthening the stability of the symmetric equilibrium. In particular,
the introduction of an overlapping generation structure motivates the anti-
agglomerative turnover effect as a third channel via which production shift-
ing changes the profitability of home-based firms. This dispersion force is
based on the distributional effects caused by the turnover of generations. An
exogenous rise in the home capital share increases wealth and thus expendi-
ture levels of individuals being currently alive in the home region relative to
foreign-based individuals. The negative distributional effects on aggregate
expenditures resulting from birth and death, i.e. the replacement of these
individuals by newborns whose consumption expenditures are lower since
they have zero wealth levels (see section 2.2.3), are thus more pronounced
in the home region. This, in turn, decreases the home expenditure share
and therefore relative profitability. Since a higher mortality rate increases
the strength of the anti-agglomerative turnover effect, this third channel in-
tuitively explains the positive impact of µ on the stability of the symmetric
equilibrium. We can thus conclude that generalizing the constructed capital
model to allow for demographic structures introduces an additional disper-
sion force that crucially depends on the heterogeneity of individuals with
respect to their expenditure and wealth levels: as long as the consumption
expenditures of newborns are smaller than average consumption expendi-
tures, the turnover effect is active and the associated distributional effects
work against agglomeration.
of capital in his model. It hinges critically on the immobility of capital as only in this case
capital income cannot be repatriated to its immobile owners and therefore increases the
region’s own income. In our model with capital immobility it is, however, indeed the case
that the equilibrium value of the consumption expenditure share depends, via this income
effect, on the capital stock.
37
Going back to figure 2.5, we can now also explain the non-monotonicity
of the instability set with respect to the level of trade openness. From figure
2.3 it is evident that the relative strength of the agglomeration force, as rep-
resented by eigenvalue 3, is maximized for φ < 1. This is also the case for the
set-up of Baldwin (1999) with a zero mortality rate, i.e. when demographic
change is completely ignored. In particular, both the local competition and
the agglomeration force present in the constructed capital model decrease
in the level of trade openness. The local competition effect diminishes since
freer trade makes firms less dependent on the home market, whereas the
demand-linked circular causality effect is reduced as local sales increasingly
lose importance. Both forces, however, diminish at different speeds with the
competition force being reduced more rapidly for high levels of trade costs
whereas the decrease of the agglomeration force is stronger for sufficiently
low levels of trade barriers. This implies that the relative strength of the
agglomeration force is largest for an intermediate level of trade costs. Since
eigenvalue 3 remains positive and the symmetric equilibrium thus unstable
for all φ > φbreak1 (see eigenvalue 3 for µ = 0 in figure 2.3), this special
feature does not have any consequences for the instability set in the case of a
zero mortality rate. Positive mortality rates, however, additionally decreases
eigenvalue 3 for all levels of trade openness due to the anti-agglomerative
turnover effect. For µ > 0, the non-monotonicity of the relative strength of
the agglomeration force therefore qualitatively changes the stability proper-
ties of the symmetric equilibrium: as shown in figure 2.5, φbreak1 increases and
φbreak2 decreases below one implying that the symmetric equilibrium regains
its stability for sufficiently high levels of trade openness. The emergence of
an additional dispersion force, when incorporating demographic structures,
thus explains the non-monotonicity of the instability set with respect to the
level of economic integration in the case of a positive mortality rate.
2.5 Concluding remarks
The model in this paper introduces demography into the NEG literature by
generalizing the constructed capital framework of Baldwin (1999) to account
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for changes in the age structure of the population. Incorporating overlapping
generations and lifetime uncertainty allows us to investigate the impact of
demographic change on agglomeration tendencies of economic activities. We
show that the turnover of generations stabilizes the symmetric equilibrium
and thus acts as a force that promotes a more equal distribution of productive
factors between two regions.
From the point of view of economic policy, we can conclude that, in sharp
contrast to other NEG approaches, our model does not necessarily associate
sufficiently deep integration with high interregional inequality. In particular,
we have shown that plausible mortality rates are far away from supporting
agglomeration processes. Consequently, it might not be necessary to impose
any type of trade barriers in order to avoid deindustrialization of one region
resulting from decreased transport costs. Especially in the case of the Eu-
ropean Union this implies that there is no trade-off between its two most
important targets: integration on the one hand and interregional equality
on the other hand. Instead, the implementation of appropriate policies to
achieve one objective does not interfere with the realization of the other.
However, introducing overlapping generations and lifetime uncertainty
was only a first step toward a more comprehensive understanding of the in-
terrelations between demographic change, economic integration and agglom-
eration. First of all, it is essential to consider a broader view of demographic
change that does not only focus on changes in the population age structure
but also on varying population growth rates. By relaxing the assumption of
equal birth and mortality rates and thus allowing for population growth one
could e.g. asses agglomeration processes for various demographic scenarios.
In particular, it would be possible to analyze a situation of declining fertility
resulting in both population aging and slower population growth. Moreover,
the assumption of a constant mortality rate adopted for the sake of analytical
tractability is still at odds with reality. Using age-dependent mortality rates
is therefore one possible line for future research. Similarly, investigating the
effects of age-dependent labor productivity on agglomeration processes might
yield important insights, especially when viewing labor productivity as deci-
sive for a region’s competitiveness. Last but not least, it would be worthwhile
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to consider asymmetric regions, in particular with respect to mortality. In
such a setting one could investigate how differences in mortality rates are
linked to differences in capital accumulation rates, again a question of high
relevance for economic policy.
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Chapter 3
Agglomeration processes in
aging societies1
3.1 Introduction
With the ongoing worldwide economic integration during the last decades,
economists’ and policy makers’ interest in the location of economic activity
has dramatically risen (see e.g. Fujita and Thisse (2002) and the World Bank
(2009) development report on economic geography). Within the European
Union for example, regional cohesion policies targeted at a more equal spatial
allocation of resources are on top of the political agenda. At the same time,
as illustrated in the special report on aging populations of The Economist
(2009), demographic change has been creating serious economic challenges for
industrialized countries. In particular, declining fertility has caused upward
shifts in the mean age of most countries’ populations while simultaneously
reducing population growth rates (see Eurostat (2004) and United Nations
(2007)).
Up to now, these two issues have been analyzed independently of each
other, with the New Economic Geography (NEG) addressing the impact of
deeper economic integration on the spatial concentration of productive fac-
tors and overlapping generation models investigating the effects of demogra-
1Joint work with Klaus Prettner.
41
phy on macroeconomic aggregates. This division is unfortunate since both
demographic change and economic integration crucially influence demand
patterns which themselves are - via the returns to productive factors - deci-
sive for the spatial distribution of economic activity. Explaining agglomera-
tion processes without accounting for demographic developments thus misses
a fundamental point.
The paper in chapter 2 has made a first step toward closing this gap by
merging these two research strands and for the first time providing a uni-
fied framework within which the linkage between demographic change and
agglomeration can be accurately analyzed. In particular, it has shown that
introducing an overlapping generation setting where individuals face life-
time uncertainty considerably reduces agglomeration tendencies. By equal-
izing the birth to the death rate, the analysis was, however, restricted to
changes in the population age structure and thus neglected the effects of
varying population growth due to demographic change. Since declining fer-
tility leads to decreasing population growth rates while lower mortality rates
imply higher population growth, it is essential to reassess the impact of de-
mographic change on the location of industries in a setting with nonconstant
population size. Having this purpose in mind, the model presented in this
paper extends the approach of chapter 2 by allowing for nonequal birth and
mortality rates and thus growing populations. In particular, we generalize
the constructed capital model of Baldwin (1999) by incorporating the over-
lapping generation structure of Buiter (1988) to arrive at a NEG framework
featuring both population aging and varying population size.
In the constructed capital model of Baldwin (1999) concentration of eco-
nomic activity is explained via a demand-linked circular causality whose pro-
agglomerative effect is strongest for high levels of economic integration. In
particular, with interregionally immobile capital, a higher capital stock raises
capital income and thus expenditures which leads to an increase in the cap-
ital rental rate and therefore to further capital accumulation. Since higher
capital accumulation is typically associated with medium-run growth, this
two-region neoclassical growth framework illustrates how economic integra-
tion can lead to the emergence of “rust” and “boom belts”. Its intertem-
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porally optimized saving features moreover allow an easy incorporation of
overlapping generations with individuals that face a positive probability of
death and differ with respect to their age. By using the overlapping genera-
tion structure of Buiter (1988), demographic change capturing both changes
in the population age structure and/or in the population growth rate can be
analyzed via variations in either the birth or the mortality rates. In particu-
lar, we can analyze a situation of population aging and declining population
growth rates as recently faced by many industrialized countries. Overall, our
modeling strategy does not only allow us to accurately analyze agglomeration
processes in aging societies but also provides us with a more convincing de-
scription of reality compared to the setting with one infinitely lived individual
of Baldwin (1999).
Our results show that the possibility of agglomeration crucially hinges
on the economies’ demographic properties, i.e. on the birth and mortality
rate. While declining birth rates strengthen agglomeration processes, declin-
ing mortality rates weaken them. These differential effects on the stability
properties of the symmetric equilibrium are due to the opposite impact of
changes in the birth and mortality rate on the population size. Lower birth
rates decrease the population growth rate, while lower mortality rates in-
crease it. Since population growth weakens the wealth and thus expenditure
increase due to a higher capital stock, it acts as an important dispersion
force. For declining birth rates, the population growth based channel there-
fore strengthens the pro-agglomerative effects of a lower turnover of genera-
tions as identified in chapter 2, while for declining mortality rates the implied
increase in the population growth rate counteracts and even dominates the
impacts via the turnover channel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the model framework and derives the equilibrium laws of motion for capital
and expenditures. Section 3.3 first verifies the existence of a symmetric
long-run equilibrium and then investigates its stability properties. In doing
so, we can not only analyze agglomeration processes in aging societies but
also isolate the population growth based effect on agglomeration. Finally,
section 3.4 contains concluding remarks and sketches possible lines of further
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research.
3.2 The model
This section describes how we integrate the overlapping generation struc-
ture with growing populations of Buiter (1988) into the constructed capital
framework of Baldwin (1999) to arrive at a NEG framework allowing for both
population aging and varying population size.
There are two symmetric regions or countries, denoted as H (home) and
F (foreign)2, with identical production technologies, trade costs, preferences
of individuals, labor endowments and demographic structures. Each region
has three economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and investment) with
two immobile factors (labor L and capital K) at their disposal.
The homogeneous agricultural good, which is also the nume´raire good
and denoted as z, is produced under constant returns to scale in a perfectly
competitive market using labor as the only input with, by choice of units, an
input coefficient of one. It can be freely traded between the two regions.
Manufacturing firms behave as in the monopolistic competition frame-
work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and therefore produce horizontally differ-
entiated varieties, m, with one unit of capital as fixed input and a variable
per unit requirement of am units of labor. Since each variety exactly requires
one unit of capital, a continuum of varieties i ∈ (0, K] is produced at home,
whereas a continuum of varieties j ∈ (0, K∗] is manufactured in the foreign
region. In contrast to the agricultural good, trade of manufactures involves
iceberg transport costs such that ϕ ≥ 1 units of a certain good have to be
shipped in order to sell one unit abroad (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Firms thus face an increasing returns to scale production technology with
an associated cost function pi +wamYm(i), where pi is the capital rental rate
representing the fixed cost, w is the wage per efficiency unit of labor and
2If further distinction is needed, foreign variables are moreover indicated by an asterisk.
In particular, the superscript F denotes that a good was produced in the foreign region,
whereas the asterisk indicates that it is consumed in the foreign region. In what follows,
emphasis will be on the home region. The corresponding expressions for the foreign region
can be derived by symmetry.
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Ym(i) is total output of one manufacturing good producer.
In the Walrasian investment sector, capital, i.e. machines, are produced
using labor as the only input with an input coefficient of ai. Wages of the
workers are paid out of individuals’ savings. Following Baldwin (1999), a
share δ > 0 of the capital stock depreciates at each instant.
Concerning the overlapping generation structure of our model economy,
we closely follow Buiter (1988). We assume that at each point in time,
τ ∈ [0,∞), a large cohort consisting of new individuals is born. Newborns
receive no bequests and thus start their lives without any wealth. Each indi-
vidual’s time of death is stochastic with an exponential probability density
function parameterized by the constant instantaneous mortality rate µ > 0.
Normalizing initial population size N(0) to one, the size of the cohort born at
t0 at a certain point in time τ is N(t0, τ) = βe
βt0e−µτ (see appendix A.2.1)3,
where β > 0 is the constant birth rate. Consequently, total population size
at time τ is given by
N(τ) =
∫ τ
−∞
N(t0, τ)dt0
=
∫ τ
−∞
βeβt0e−µτdt0
= e(β−µ)τ , (3.1)
where we denote its growth rate as n ≡ β − µ.
Since there is no heterogeneity between members of the same cohort, each
cohort can be described by one representative individual, who inelastically
supplies her efficiency units of labor l on the labor market with perfect mo-
bility across sectors but immobility between regions. Finally, as in Yaari
(1965), individuals can insure themselves against the risk of dying with pos-
itive assets by buying actuarial notes of a fair life insurance company which
are canceled upon their death.
3In what follows the first time index of a variable will refer to the birth date, whereas
the second will indicate a certain point in time.
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3.2.1 Individual consumption behavior
Preferences over the agricultural good and a CES composite of the manu-
facturing varieties are Cobb-Douglas. The representative individual of the
cohort born at t0 chooses at each instant τ > t0 consumption of the agricul-
tural good, cz(t0, τ), consumption of varieties produced at home, c
H
m(i, t0, τ),
and consumption of varieties produced abroad, cFm(j, t0, τ), to maximize her
expected lifetime utility at time t0
4
U(t0, t0) =
∫ ∞
t0
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t0) ln
[
(cz(t0, τ))
1−ξ(caggm (t0, τ))
ξ
]
dτ, (3.2)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time preference, 0 < ξ < 1 is the manufac-
turing share of consumption and
caggm (t0, τ) ≡
[∫ K(τ)
0
(
cHm(i, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(
cFm(j, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
represents consumption of the CES composite with σ > 1 being the elasticity
of substitution between varieties.
The wealth constraint of a representative individual is given by
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
+ µk(t0, τ)− δk(t0, τ), (3.3)
where k(t0, τ) is the individual capital stock and e(t0, τ) are individual ex-
penditures for consumption defined as
e(t0, τ) ≡ pz(τ)cz(t0, τ) +
∫ K(τ)
0
pHm(i, τ)c
H
m(i, t0, τ)di+∫ K∗(τ)
0
pFm,ϕ(j, τ)c
F
m(j, t0, τ)dj.
Here pz(τ) is the price of the agricultural good, p
H
m(i, τ) the price of a manu-
4Equation (3.2) can be easily derived by calculating expected lifetime utility, where
the date of death is a random variable with an exponential probability density function
parameterized by a constant instantaneous mortality rate µ.
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factured variety produced at home and pFm,ϕ(j, τ) the price of a manufactured
variety produced abroad with the subscript ϕ indicating the dependence on
transport costs. This wealth constraint displays the structure of the invest-
ment sector by showing that individual savings, defined as income minus
consumption expenditures, are transformed into capital.
The law of motion for capital given in equation (3.3) is based on the
full insurance result of Yaari (1965) implying that individuals save solely
in the form of actuarial notes from the life insurance company, whose fair
rate exceeds the market rate of return on capital, pi(τ)
w(τ)ai
− δ, by µ (see Yaari
(1965)).
The individual’s utility optimization problem can be solved by applying
a three stage procedure.5 The first stage analyzes the dynamic savings-
expenditure decision and results in the Euler equation for the representative
individual of the cohort born at t0
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
aiw(τ)
− δ − ρ. (3.4)
Stage two and three finally deal with the static optimal consumption alloca-
tion between the CES composite and the agricultural good as well as with
the allocation of consumption to each of the varieties. Altogether this leads
to the following demand functions for the agricultural good and for each of
the manufactured varieties
cz(t0, τ) =
(1− ξ)e(t0, τ)
pz(τ)
, (3.5)
cHm(i, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(p
H
m(i, τ))
−σ[∫ K(τ)
0
(pHm(i, τ))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
1−σdj
] , (3.6)
cFm(j, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))
−σ[∫ K(τ)
0
(pHm(i, τ))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
1−σdj
] . (3.7)
5For details of the derivations see chapter 2 and its appendix A.1.
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3.2.2 Aggregation
Due to the overlapping generation structure, our model setup does not fea-
ture one single representative individual. Corresponding to any individual
variable we thus define population aggregates that follow from aggregating
up over all cohorts. For capital and expenditures, these aggregation rules are
formally given by
K(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0,
= βe−µt
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)e
βt0dt0, (3.8)
E(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0,
= βe−µt
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)e
βt0dt0, (3.9)
where K(t) is the aggregate capital stock and E(t) denotes aggregate con-
sumption expenditures.6
For each population aggregate variable X(t), the corresponding quantity
per capita is defined by x˜(t) = X(t)e−nt (see Buiter (1988)). Using this
notational convention, we derive in appendix A.2.1 the following laws of
motion for per capita expenditures e˜(t) and per capita capital k˜(t)
˙˜e(t) =
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
˜e(t)− β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t), (3.10)
˙˜k(t) =
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − β + µ
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
, (3.11)
where analogous equations hold in the foreign region. In contrast to the set-
ting with a constant population size of chapter 2, where the mortality rate
only enters the aggregate Euler equation, demographic parameters appear in
both laws of motion. In particular, the law of motion of per capita expen-
ditures differs from the individual Euler equation by −β(ρ + µ)aiw(t)k˜(t).
6Note that aggregate efficiency units of labor are accordingly given by L(t) = le(β−µ)t.
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Rewriting equation (3.10) as (see also appendix A.2.1)
˙˜e(t)
e˜(t)
=
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
− β e˜(t)− e(t, t)
e˜(t)
(3.12)
sheds more light on how to explain the emergence of this additional term.
As explained in detail in chapter 2 for the case of a constant population size,
the difference between individual and per capita consumption expenditure
growth is due to the distributional effects of the turnover of generations. At
each instant in time a fraction µ of wealthier individuals with high consump-
tion expenditures dies7 and is replaced by a fraction β of newborns without
capital holdings and thus lower consumption expenditures. This continually
ongoing process captured by the difference between average consumption ex-
penditures e˜(t) and consumption expenditures of newborns e(t, t) slows down
per capita consumption expenditure growth (aggregate economy average) rel-
ative to individual consumption expenditure growth.
Whereas both the birth and the mortality rate strengthen the turnover
correction term and thus decrease per capita expenditure growth8, their ef-
fects on the per capita law of motion of capital are of opposite sign. Obvi-
ously, it is in fact the population growth rate n = β − µ that enters the per
capita law of motion for capital. A higher n decreases per capita accumula-
tion by decreasing the market rate of return on capital. It is not surprising
that this last relationship will become crucial when investigating the effects
of population growth on agglomeration tendencies. To do so, we first have to
determine the equilibrium factor prices resulting out of profit maximization
in order to arrive at a dynamic system for expenditures and capital that fully
describes the evolution of our economy.
7Due to the law of large numbers, the individual probability of dying is equal to the
fraction of individuals who die at each instant.
8Recall that by equalizing the birth to the death rate, the framework in chapter 2 was
not able to differentiate between the impact of varying birth and mortality rates, i.e. only
µ appeared in the turnover correction term.
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3.2.3 Profit maximization
Profit maximization and perfect competition in the agricultural sector imply
that the price of an agricultural good equals its marginal cost. Since labor is
perfectly mobile across sectors, the wage rate in the economy is thus pinned
down by the price of the agricultural good. Free trade equalizes this price and
thus wages across regions as long as each region produces some agricultural
output which will be assumed from now on.9 We thus have
w(t) = w∗(t) = 1, (3.13)
since the agricultural good has been chosen as the nume´raire.
Profit maximization in the monopolistically competitive manufacturing
sector10 yields
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)am, (3.14)
pFm,ϕ(i, t) = p
H
m(i, t)ϕ. (3.15)
Prices are equal to a constant markup over marginal costs and mill pricing
is optimal, i.e. the only difference between prices in the two regions is due
to transport costs (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Since there is free entry into the manufacturing sector, pure profits will be
driven down to zero. Consequently, the capital rental rate, which represents
the fixed costs of each manufacturing firm, is pinned down by the level of
operating profits. Using optimal prices given in equations (3.14) and (3.15)
together with equations (3.6) and (3.7) and redefining global quantities and
regional share variables gives operating profits and thus capital rental rates
9See Baldwin (1999) for details on this assumption.
10See again chapter 2 and its appendix A.1 for details of the derivations.
50
as11
pi =
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (3.16)
pi∗ =
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (3.17)
where φ ≡ ϕ1−σ measures trade openness between the two regions with
φ = 0 indicating prohibitive trade barriers and φ = 1 free trade. World
expenditures are defined as EW ≡ E + E∗ and the world capital stock as
KW ≡ K+K∗ with θK and θE referring to the home shares of these quantities.
At the symmetric equilibrium with θK = 1/2 and θE = 1/2, shifting ex-
penditure to home (dθE > 0) raises pi and lowers pi
∗ since it increases the
home market size. A higher expenditure share therefore promotes agglomer-
ation of capital at home because capital accumulates where the rental rate
is higher and decumulates in the other region. Production shifting to home
(dθK > 0), on the other hand, has the opposite effects because it increases
competition in the home market (local competition effect). The relative
strength of both forces determines whether agglomeration processes set in
in a framework ignoring demographic change. In particular, Baldwin (1999)
shows that the pro-agglomerative force dominates for sufficiently high levels
of trade openness.
The paper presented in chapter 2 has already shown that an overlapping
generation structure with lifetime uncertainty introduces a crucial third force
working via the turnover correction term. Since a higher capital stock in one
region implies that dying individuals are on average richer, the distributional
effects are more severe relative to the region with the lower capital stock.
Consequently, the turnover of generations acts as an anti-agglomerative force
by reducing relative aggregate consumption expenditure growth of the region
with the higher capital stock. The crucial question to be analyzed in the fol-
lowing sections is how the introduction of a nonconstant population size,
i.e. µ 6= β, affects this linkage between demographic change and agglom-
11We ignore time arguments here. Note, moreover, that ξ = ξ∗ and σ = σ∗ due to
symmetry between regions. For further details of the derivations see again chapter 2 and
its appendix A.1.
51
eration. In particular, we investigate how population aging as represented
by declining fertility rates impacts upon the spatial distribution of economic
activity by simultaneously taking into account the associated changes in the
population growth rate.
3.3 The impact of demographic change on ag-
glomeration
To assess whether and how demographic change impacts upon agglomeration
processes we analyze the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium
more thoroughly. If it turns out that this steady state is unstable, then any
slight perturbation will lead us away from an equal distribution of capital
and expenditures and thus result in agglomeration processes.
3.3.1 Long-run equilibrium
Using the rental rates from equations (3.16) and (3.17) reformulated as func-
tions of the variables e˜, e˜∗, k˜ and k˜∗ (see appendix A.2.2) as well as the
equilibrium wages from equation (3.13) in the per capita laws of motion of
capital and consumption expenditures (3.10) and (3.11) yields the following
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four dimensional system12
˙˜e =
[(
e˜
k˜ + φk˜∗
+
e˜∗φ
φk˜ + k˜∗
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − ρ
]
e˜− β(ρ+ µ)aik˜,
(3.18)
˙˜e∗ =
[(
e˜∗
k˜∗ + φk˜
+
e˜φ
φk˜∗ + k˜
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − ρ
]
e˜∗ − β(ρ+ µ)aik˜∗,
(3.19)
˙˜k =
[(
e˜
k˜ + φk˜∗
+
e˜∗φ
φk˜ + k˜∗
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − β + µ
]
k˜ +
l˜
ai
− e˜
ai
,
(3.20)
˙˜k∗ =
[(
e˜∗
k˜∗ + φk˜
+
e˜φ
φk˜∗ + k˜
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − β + µ
]
k˜∗ +
l˜
ai
− e˜
∗
ai
.
(3.21)
These four differential equations in the variables e˜, e˜∗, k˜ and k˜∗ fully describe
the dynamics of our NEG model with overlapping generations and a noncon-
stant population size. Note that they nest both the Baldwin (1999) set-up
with β = µ = 0 as well as the framework of chapter 2 with β = µ > 0 as
special cases. The latter will turn out to be particularly useful when we try
to isolate the effect of population growth on agglomeration tendencies.
Inserting the symmetric outcome e˜ = e˜∗ and k˜ = k˜∗ into the above system
indeed reveals that it is a steady state with the equilibrium values given by13
¯˜e =
l˜σ ((δ − µ)√σ (A+B) + β ((δ + ρ− 2µ)σ + 2(µ+ ρ)ξ + A√σ))
2((δ − µ)σ + βξ)((β + δ + ρ)σ − (µ+ ρ)ξ) ,
(3.22)
¯˜k =
l˜ ((ρσ −√σA)(σ − ξ) + 2σξ(β − µ) + δσ(σ + ξ))
2ai((δ − µ)σ + βξ)((β + δ + ρ)σ − (µ+ ρ)ξ) , (3.23)
where A ≡√σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4β(µ+ ρ)ξ and B ≡ (δ + ρ)√σ.
12We again suppress time arguments here. Note, moreover, that we have l˜ = l˜∗, µ = µ∗,
β = β∗ ai = a∗i , δ = δ
∗ and ρ = ρ∗ due to symmetry between regions.
13These and most of the following results were derived with Mathematica. The cor-
responding files are available from the authors upon request. Note also that we restrict
attention to the economically meaningful solution pair, i.e. where consumption and capital
is positive for plausible parameter values.
53
3.3.2 Formal stability analysis
To analyze the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium we first
linearize the non-linear dynamic system given in equations (3.18), (3.19),
(3.20) and (3.21) around the symmetric equilibrium (3.22) and (3.23), and
then evaluate the eigenvalues of the corresponding 4× 4 Jacobian matrix
Jsym =
(
J1 J2
J3 J4
)
, (3.24)
where the four symmetric 2 × 2 sub-matrices Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4 are given
in appendix A.2.3 (for this classical approach of stability analysis see e.g.
the appendix on mathematical methods in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)).
Solving the characteristic equation yields the following four eigenvalues
eig1 =
1
2
(r1 −
√
rad1), (3.25)
eig2 =
1
2
(r1 +
√
rad1), (3.26)
eig3 =
1
2(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(r2 −
√
rad2), (3.27)
eig4 =
1
2(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(r2 +
√
rad2), (3.28)
where
r1 ≡ A√
σ
− β − δ + µ,
rad1 ≡
(
A√
σ
+ β + δ − µ
)2
+
(σ − ξ)
(
(A+B)2 + 4β(µ+ ρ)ξ
)
σξ
,
r2 ≡
√
σ
(
µ− β(φ+ 1)2 − δ (2φ2 + φ+ 1)+ φ(µ(φ+ 2)− ρ(φ− 1)))
+A(3φ+ 1),
rad2 ≡
(
A(φ− 1) + (µ(φ+ 1)2 − β(φ+ 1)2 + δ(φ− 1) + φ(φ+ 3)ρ)√σ)2 +
(φ+ 1)((φ+ 1)σ + (φ− 1)ξ)
(
4β(µ+ ρ)ξ(φ+ 1)2 + (φ− 1)2 (A+B)2
)
ξ
.
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The nature and signs of these eigenvalues fully characterize the system’s local
dynamics around the symmetric equilibrium. First it is easily established
that all four eigenvalues are real since both rad1 and rad2 are nonnegative
for all possible parameter values.14 Turning to the signs of the eigenvalues,
the analysis is more involved. Indeed, the above eigenvalues can be used to
assess the effects of demographic change on the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium for all three cases of growing population, i.e. β > µ,
shrinking population, i.e. β < µ, and a constant population size, i.e. β = µ.
The last scenario has already been investigated in the paper presented in
chapter 2 showing that in this case eigenvalue three is decisive for the stability
properties of the symmetric equilibrium. In particular, the system is saddle
path stable only for parameter ranges that yield a negative eigenvalue three.
For the case of positive population growth, i.e. β > µ, eigenvalue three
retains its crucial role, which becomes clear when checking the signs of the
remaining other eigenvalues. Note first, that the sign of r1 is ambiguous.
15
As far as eigenvalue 1 is concerned, it is for sure nonpositive as long as
r1 < 0. For the case of r1 > 0, we can show that r
2
1 < rad1 implying that
eigenvalue 1 never gets positive. The last inequality moreover yields that
eigenvalue 2, on the other hand, is always nonnegative.16 Finally, turning to
the sign of eigenvalue 4, note first that r2 again does not have an unambiguous
sign.17 For r2 ≥ 0, eigenvalue 4 is for sure nonnegative. Using Mathematica,
it is, however, possible to show that r2 +
√
rad2 > 0 even for negative r2
implying that eigenvalue 4 is nonnegative for all possible parameter ranges.
Summarizing, we have two positive and one negative eigenvalue. Both for
the case of constant population size and population growth the symmetric
equilibrium thus becomes unstable for parameter values, and in particular
birth and mortality rates, that yield a positive eigenvalue 3.
For the case of population shrinking, i.e. µ > β, only eigenvalue 2 and 4
have unambiguous signs. Note first, that r1 > 0 if µ > β which immediately
14Recall the parameter ranges µ > 0, β > 0, δ > 0, σ > 1, ρ > 0, 0 < ξ < 1 and
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 which also imply that A > 0 and B > 0. In particular, note that σ > ξ.
15In particular, r1 becomes negative for sufficiently high β.
16For r1 > 0 this follows trivially, r21 < rad1 also shows it for r1 < 0.
17In particular, r2 becomes negative for sufficiently high β.
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proves the nonnegativity of eigenvalue 2. Similarly, it can be shown that
r2 > 0 if µ > β
18 implying that eigenvalue 4 is always nonnegative as well.
Thus, for the case of population shrinking, agglomeration processes will set in
for birth or mortality rates for which at least either eigenvalue 1 or eigenvalue
3 is positive.
Since the above findings illustrate that demographic change, i.e. varia-
tions in β and µ, can only influence the stability properties of the symmetric
equilibrium via eigenvalue 3 for the case of β ≥ µ and eigenvalues 1 and 3 for
β < µ, it is immediate to investigate them more thoroughly. Figures 3.1 and
3.2, which plot the contour lines of eigenvalues 1 and 3 for different birth and
mortality rates19, show that both of them switch their sign depending on the
economies’ demographic parameters. For the case of population shrinking,
i.e. β < µ, note moreover that for all combinations of β and µ for which
eigenvalue 3 switches sign, eigenvalue 1 is still negative. These observations
immediately result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. The possibility of agglomeration crucially hinges on the
economies’ demographic properties. In particular, both the birth and the mor-
tality rate are decisive for the stability properties of the symmetric equilib-
rium.
Proof. See figures 3.1 and 3.2 and above arguing on the eigenvalues’ signs.
Proposition 3.1 extends the result presented in chapter 2 that with β = µ
agglomeration processes crucially depend on the mortality rate. In a set-
ting with nonconstant population size it is both the birth and the mortality
18This follows from rewriting
r2 = A(3φ+ 1) +
√
σ
(−δ (2φ2 + φ+ 1)+ φρ(1− φ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 1
+
√
σ
(−β(φ+ 1)2 + µ+ φµ(φ+ 2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 2
and noting that term 1 is nonnegative for all parameter ranges (see chapter 2 for details)
while term 2 is nonnegative as long as µ ≥ β.
19Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are plotted for δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 and φ = 0.98.
Note the we use different ranges of µ and β to focus on the parameter region where the
eigenvalues switch sign.
56
Figure 3.1: Contour plot of eigenvalue 3
Figure 3.2: Contour plot of eigenvalue 1
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rate that determine the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium.
Consequently, in order to fully understand the linkage between demographic
change and agglomeration, we must investigate how changes in either of them
impact upon agglomeration tendencies. The next subsection precisely deals
with this question.
3.3.3 Agglomeration processes in aging societies
In the framework with constant population size of chapter 2, changes in µ
and thus β only change the population age structure. With β 6= µ, varying
either of them, however, also changes the population growth rate. In par-
ticular, declines in the birth rate imply both population aging and a lower
population growth rate, whereas changes in the mortality rate leave the mean
age unchanged20 and only alter population growth (see chapter 7 in Preston
et al. (2001)). In order to assess agglomeration tendencies in aging societies
we thus focus on the case of declining birth rates. Moreover, by additionally
investigating how the mortality rate impacts upon the stability properties of
the symmetric equilibrium, we gain important insights with respect to the
population growth based channel on agglomeration.
Figure 3.1 has already indicated the qualitative effect of declining birth
and mortality rates on agglomeration processes. Eigenvalue 3 decreases in the
birth rate and increases in the mortality rate. Figures 3.3 and 3.421 confirm
this observation by plotting eigenvalue 3 as a function of trade openness for
different β and µ. Only for sufficiently low β or high µ we can find levels of
economic integration for which eigenvalue 3 gets positive and the symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable.22
20This can be easily shown by noting that the proportion of the population at age t− t0
is given by N(t0,t)N(t) = βe
−β(t−t0) which is independent of µ. Intuitively, a lower mortality
rate on the one hand decreases the tendency to die more quickly and thus makes the
population older but on the other hand also increases the population growth rate which
exactly offsets the individual aging effect by making the population younger.
21Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are plotted for δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4. For figure
3.3 we moreover fix µ = 0.001 and for figure 3.4 we set β = 0.001.
22This also holds for the case of population shrinking, since, as figures 3.1 and 3.2
indicate, the parameter range within which eigenvalue 1 is positive is a subset of the
corresponding one of eigenvalue 3. Thus eigenvalue 3 is decisive for the stability properties
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Figure 3.3: Eigenvalue 3 as a function of φ for varying β
Figure 3.4: Eigenvalue 3 as a function of φ for varying µ
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Declining fertility rates leading to an older population age structure and
lower population growth rates at the same time thus destabilize the symmet-
ric equilibrium, i.e. population aging strengthens agglomeration processes.
This is in line with the main finding of chapter 2 that with β = µ, increasing
µ (and thus also β) above zero (which leads to a younger population struc-
ture while leaving the population growth rate unchanged) and thus allowing
for a turnover of generations, considerably stabilizes the symmetric equilib-
rium such that for plausible demographic structures agglomeration processes
do not set in. This last observation turns out to also hold in the present
setting with nonconstant population size: for a plausible mortality rate of
µ = 0.0125 resulting in a life expectancy of 80 years23 agglomeration pro-
cesses never take place as long as β > 0.00051.24 A fertility rate below such
a value would clearly be at odds with reality.25
While the birth rate mimics the effects of demographic change on agglom-
eration found in a setting with constant population size, the mortality rate’s
impact is completely opposite. In particular, lower mortality rates decrease
eigenvalue 3 and thus make the symmetric equilibrium more stable. Since
changes in the mortality and birth rate affect population growth differently,
it is immediate to suspect a population growth based channel to augment the
effects of the turnover of generations, which have been identified in chapter 2
as the only link between demographic change and agglomeration in a setting
with constant population size. Indeed, equation (3.10) clearly shows that the
turnover correction term increases in both demographic parameters imply-
ing that declining µ and β should both strengthen agglomeration processes.
Lower birth rates, however, decrease the population growth rate, while lower
mortality rates increase it. The above findings thus suggest that population
growth rate declines as resulting from lower β act as an additional agglom-
eration force, while population growth rate increases due to lower µ stabilize
the symmetric equilibrium. For declining birth rates, the population growth
of the symmetric equilibrium even for the case of a shrinking population.
23Since the probability of death during each year equals µ, average life expectancy is 1µ .
24We again set δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 for this calculation.
25A birth rate of β = 0.00051 would imply 0.00051 children per individual.
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based channel simply reinforces the turnover effect, while it counteracts and
even dominates the turnover channel for the case of declining mortality rates.
Moreover, by recalling from chapter 2 that contemporaneous increases in the
birth and mortality rate increase stability, we can also conclude that the
birth rate effect dominates the mortality rate effect for the case of constant
population size. The next subsection is devoted to verifying this additional
population growth based channel on agglomeration processes.
3.3.4 The population growth effect
Since the analysis in chapter 2 has shown that with β = µ demographic
change only affects the symmetric equilibrium’s stability properties via the
turnover channel, it is possible to isolate the effects of changes in the popu-
lation growth rate on agglomeration tendencies by comparing the instability
regions of constant to those of varying population size. This is achieved in
figure 3.5 which plots the instability region as a function of the birth rate
for the case of zero and the case of positive or negative population growth.26
In particular, the borders of the instability region are given by the critical
levels of economic integration φbreak1 and φbreak2 (see chapter 2 for details)
within which eigenvalue 3 is positive and thus agglomeration processes may
set in.27
Figure 3.5 confirms our above mentioned presumptions about the effects
of changes in the population growth rate. We see that for positive popu-
lation growth, i.e. β > 0.003, the instability region gets smaller compared
to the case of constant population size, whereas it increases for the case of
population shrinking, i.e. β < 0.003. This identifies population growth as an
additional dispersion force fostering a more equal distribution of productive
factors and explaining the differential impact of β and µ on agglomeration
processes.
26Note that we now use slightly different parameter values, i.e. δ = 0.1, ρ = 0.1, ξ = 0.4,
σ = 2, to increase the visibility of the population growth effect. For the varying population
size case, we fix µ at 0.003.
27Recall that even for the case of population shrinking, eigenvalue 3 is decisive for the
stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium since the instability region implicitly
defined by eigenvalue 1 is a subset of the instability region defined by eigenvalue 3.
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Figure 3.5: Instability region (φbreak1 and φbreak2) for constant and varying
population size
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Figure 3.5 also suggests one qualification to the main finding of the paper
presented in chapter 2 that agglomeration processes are considerably reduced
for positive birth and mortality rates. Indeed, for sufficiently strong popula-
tion shrinking, i.e. µ > β > 0, the instability region is bigger than for the
case of µ = β = 0 (as represented by the solid line for β = 0). Only for the
case of a nonnegative population growth rate agglomeration tendencies are
thus for sure reduced compared to a setting ignoring demographic structures.
To gain some economic intuition about the particular channel via which
population growth impacts upon agglomeration processes, it is useful to re-
consider the more informal way of checking the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium followed by Baldwin (1999). This informal way is
based on investigating how an exogenous perturbation of the home share of
capital, θK , influences the home capital rental rate relative to the foreign cap-
ital rental rate. A positive impact implies instability as capital accumulation
would be fostered in the home relative to the foreign region.
Overall, there are four channels via which capital shifting changes the
capital rental rate. The first two are the standard anti-agglomerative local
competition effect and the pro-agglomerative demand-linked circular causal-
ity first introduced by Baldwin (1999). The latter shows that a higher share
of capital in one region increases, via higher wealth levels, expenditures and
thus operating profits, i.e. capital rental rates, which speeds up capital ac-
cumulation. The former, on the other hand, captures the negative impact
of agglomeration of capital, i.e. firms, on capital rental rates due to more
severe competition (see section 3.2.3).
In a setting allowing for demographic change in terms of both popula-
tion aging and varying population size, two additional forces linked to the
economies’ demographic parameters β and µ appear. First, there is the anti-
agglomerative turnover effect (see again section 3.2.3). An exogenous rise
in the home capital share increases wealth and thus expenditure levels of
individuals being currently alive in the home region relative to foreign-based
individuals. The negative distributional effects on per capita expenditures
resulting from birth and death, i.e. the replacement of dying individuals by
newborns whose consumption expenditures are lower since they have zero
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wealth levels, are thus more pronounced in the home region. This, in turn,
decreases the home expenditure share and therefore relative profitability and
capital rental rates.
Both higher birth and mortality rates strengthen this first force between
demography and agglomeration, which is in sharp contrast to the population
growth based channel that additionally affects the linkage between capital
shifting and the capital rental for β 6= µ. As already indicated in section
3.2.2, the impact of β and µ in the law of motion of per capita capital is of
opposite sign. In particular, equation (3.11) clearly shows that the market
rate of return on capital pi
w(t)ai
−δ−β+µ depends negatively on n ≡ β−µ. The
wealth increase due to higher capital income resulting from capital shifting
is thus less pronounced the larger is n. This decreased impact upon wealth
translates into lower expenditure increases and finally lower increases in the
capital rental rate which precisely explains the anti-agglomerative effect of
population growth.
3.4 Concluding remarks
The model presented in this paper sheds more light on the linkage between
demographic change and agglomeration. In particular, it analyzes agglom-
eration processes in aging societies and identifies the channels via which
demographic developments influence the spatial distribution of economic ac-
tivity. We extend the framework of chapter 2, that already incorporates an
overlapping generation structure and lifetime uncertainty in the constructed
capital model of Baldwin (1999), by additionally allowing for a nonconstant
population size. Changes in either the birth or mortality rate are thus accom-
panied by changes in the population growth rate. Since population growth
per se acts as an important dispersion force and fertility and mortality have
opposite effects on this rate, their impacts with respect to the spatial distri-
bution of economic activity also differ. In particular, declining fertility rates
strengthen agglomeration processes while declining mortality rates weaken
them.
Our framework is suited to assess the possibility of agglomeration tenden-
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cies for various demographic developments. Most relevant for industrialized
countries is probably the one of declining fertility rates leading to both pop-
ulation aging and slower population growth. We find that in such a situation
agglomeration tendencies are strengthened but still weaker than in a setting
that fully ignores demographic structures. In particular, our calibrations sug-
gest that also these countries are currently far away from a situation where
catastrophic agglomeration is likely to occur.
Despite the fact that allowing for population growth constitutes one fur-
ther step toward a more comprehensive understanding of the interrelations
between demographic change and agglomeration, many issues still remain
open. The above findings e.g. indicate the need for analyzing the combined
effect of varying birth and mortality rates. In particular, having the opposite
effects of birth and mortality rates on agglomeration processes in mind, it
is immediate to ask what happens if an economy faces both declining birth
and mortality rates. Our results suggest that the answer to this question will
crucially depend on the resulting change in the population growth rate and
requires a direct comparison of the quantitative effects of changing birth and
mortality rates.
Finally, recognizing the tight link between the spatial distribution of econ-
omy activity and economic growth perspectives, it is worth investigating how
demographic structures impact upon regional growth rates. Since demogra-
phy has been shown to be of crucial importance for agglomeration, it is
immediate to also investigate its effects on the growth impacts of such con-
centration tendencies. This requires a NEG framework that allows for both
demographic change and endogenous long-run growth, a task being on the
top of our research agenda.
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Chapter 4
Demographic change, growth
and agglomeration
4.1 Introduction
Recently, there has been wide interest in the “economics” of population ag-
ing (see e.g. The Economist (2009)). Demographic change has crucial con-
sequences for economic behavior and development along various dimensions,
ranging from such diverse aspects as the determination of aggregate labor
productivity levels to retirement issues. In particular, it highlights that con-
sumption decisions and incentives to invest in future growth prospects vary
over the life-cycle. The latter has important implications for long-run eco-
nomic growth perspectives. The former, on the other hand, should be deci-
sive for the location of economic activity if one takes into account the mutual
dependence between the spatial distribution of production and demand de-
velopments as emphasized in the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature
(see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview). Both growth and agglom-
eration processes are, however, themselves interlinked. It is thus necessary
not only to investigate the isolated effects of age-dependent heterogeneity
on these two issues but to also consider whether and how lifetime uncer-
tainty impacts upon the linkage between growth and the spatial distribution
of economic activity.
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The relationship between growth and agglomeration processes has been
studied extensively in recent years. By claiming that “agglomeration can be
thought as the territorial counterpart of economic growth” Fujita and Thisse
(2002) emphasize that the emergence of concentration of economic activity
is traditionally associated with modern economic growth. The positive link
between growth and spatial agglomeration is mainly attributed to the fact
that technological spillovers, being the engines of endogenous growth, are lo-
calized. Consequently, being close to innovation clusters should have positive
effects on productivity and growth perspectives. Such considerations have
led to the development of integrated frameworks that combine (endogenous)
growth features with NEG models to study the joint process of creation and
location of economic activity (see e.g. Martin and Ottaviano (1999), Martin
and Ottaviano (2001), Baldwin and Forslid (2000) or Baldwin et al. (2001)).
By introducing endogenous capital in his constructed capital model Bald-
win (1999) was the first one allowing for growth features in a NEG framework.
The absence of capital mobility in his exogenous growth model implies a
demand-linked circular causality fostering agglomeration. Higher capital ac-
cumulation increases income and expenditures in the respective region which
raises capital rental rates further and thus fosters capital accumulation even
more. Baldwin et al. (2001) extended this framework by additionally allowing
for learning externalities in the capital creation sector. In their endogenous
two-region growth model both the above demand-linked agglomeration force
and a growth-linked circular causality strengthen concentration of economic
activity. The latter crucially depends on the localized nature of spillovers.
As long as spillovers are not fully globalized, spatial concentration of cap-
ital in one region implies a lower cost of capital creation and thus speeds
up accumulation relative to the other region. Growth itself can thus lead to
catastrophic agglomeration of economic activity. Moreover, with localized
learning spillovers, agglomeration also affects long-run growth perspectives.
In particular, spatial agglomeration is conducive for growth since it decreases
costs in the capital accumulation sector.
The traditional line of investigation of all these NEG approaches to growth
focuses, however, on the joint consequences of increased economic integration
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on growth and agglomeration processes while ignoring any potential effect of
demographic change. In particular, despite the fact that all these models
are intrinsically dynamic, the impact of an economy’s demographic struc-
ture, and in particular of life-cycle decisions, on consumption and saving
patterns, which themselves play a crucial role for agglomeration forces, is
completely ignored. The papers presented in chapters 2 and 3 have clearly
revealed that this limited perspective misses important mechanism that are
fundamental for the location of productive factors. Most importantly, it
was shown that incorporating an overlapping generation structure and life-
time uncertainty into the constructed capital of Baldwin (1999) introduces
an additional dispersion force that considerably reduces the possibility of
agglomeration processes. Prettner (2009), on the other hand, provides evi-
dence for a positive effect of life expectancy on long-run economic growth in
an endogenous growth framework in the spirit of Romer (1990).
This paper merges both strands of analysis by generalizing the NEG
model with learning spillovers of Baldwin et al. (2001) to allow for an over-
lapping generation structure with individuals that face a positive probability
of death and differ with respect to age. In doing so, the main emphasis is
twofold. First, the impact of lifetime uncertainty on long-run growth perspec-
tives is investigated with a view to evaluating the pro-growth effect of spatial
concentration in a setting accounting for demographic structures. Second,
the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium with respect to varying
mortality rates are analyzed. Here, attention is also paid to the impact of
lifetime uncertainty on history-versus-expectations considerations.1
What I show is that, consistent with the results presented in chapters
2 and 3, the turnover of generations acts as a dispersion force that damp-
ens the pro-agglomerative growth-linked circular causality being present as
long as interregional learning spillovers are not fully perfect. Moreover, the
model reveals that lifetime uncertainty has important implications for equi-
librium selection. An increase in the mortality rate reduces the possibility
that expectations rather than history, represented by initial conditions, are
1This debate was initiated by Krugman (1991b) and deals with the question of equilib-
rium selection in a setting with multiple equilibria (see Baldwin (2001) for a nice overview).
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decisive with respect to the question in which region agglomeration might
take place. Finally, comparing the negative effect of lifetime uncertainty
on equilibrium growth rates in the symmetric and core-periphery outcome,
shows that, in sharp contrast to existing NEG growth models with localized
knowledge spillovers, spatial agglomeration is not necessarily conducive to
growth in a setting accounting for demographic structures.
The remainder of this paper is structured into four sections. The following
section 4.2 presents the model framework and derives the dynamic system de-
scribing the evolution of the economy. Section 4.3 characterizes the long-run
equilibria and investigates the impact of lifetime uncertainty on equilibrium
growth rates. The joint effect of demography and spillovers on the stabil-
ity properties of the symmetric equilibrium is analyzed in section 4.4, which
also focuses on the role of mortality for history-versus-expectations consider-
ations. Finally, section 4.5 contains concluding remarks and indicates further
lines of research.
4.2 The model
This section describes how a notion of learning as in Baldwin et al. (2001)
can be integrated into the generalized constructed capital model of chap-
ter 2 to arrive at a NEG framework featuring both endogenous growth and
demographic change.
4.2.1 Basic structure and underlying assumptions
Consider a world economy with two symmetric regions or countries, denoted
by H for home and F for foreign2, with identical production technologies,
trade costs, preferences of individuals, labor endowments and demographic
structures. Each region has three economic sectors (agriculture, manufactur-
2If further distinction is needed, foreign variables are moreover indicated by an asterisk.
In particular, the superscript F denotes that a good was produced in the foreign region,
whereas the asterisk indicates that it is consumed in the foreign region. In what follows,
emphasis will be on the home region. The corresponding expressions for the foreign region
can be derived by symmetry.
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ing and investment) with two immobile factors (labor L and capital K) at
their disposal.
Technology
The homogeneous agricultural good, z, is produced in a perfectly competitive
market under constant returns to scale using labor as the only input with,
by choice of units, an input coefficient of one. It can be traded between the
two regions without any cost.
Manufacturing firms are modeled as in the monopolistic competition
framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and thus supply horizontally differenti-
ated varieties, m. In contrast to the agricultural good, trade of manufactures
involves iceberg transport costs such that ϕ ≥ 1 units of the differentiated
good have to be shipped in order to sell one unit abroad (see e.g. Baldwin
et al. (2003)). Each variety is produced with one unit of capital as fixed
input and labor as the variable production factor where am represents the
unit input coefficient for efficiency units of labor. Firms thus face an increas-
ing returns to scale production technology with an associated cost function
pi(t) + w(t)amYm(i, t), where pi(t) is the capital rental rate representing the
fixed cost, w(t) is the wage per efficiency unit of labor and Ym(i, t) is total
output of one manufacturing good producer. Since each variety exactly re-
quires one unit of capital, a continuum of varieties i ∈ (0, K(t)] is produced
at home, whereas a continuum of varieties j ∈ (0, K∗(t)] is manufactured in
the foreign region.
In the perfectly competitive investment (or innovation) sector, capital is
produced using labor as the only input with an input coefficient of ai(t).
Capital is viewed here as new knowledge embedded in an interregionally
immobile manufacturing facility. Wages in this sector are being paid out of
the individuals’ savings. To endogenize long-run growth in this framework, a
sector-wide learning curve is modeled by assuming that the marginal cost of
producing new capital, G(t) ≡ ai(t)w(t), declines as the sector’s cumulative
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output rises.3 Specifically,
ai(t) =
1
K(t) + ηK∗(t)
, (4.1)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 determines the degree of internationalization of learning
effects4 with η = 0 denoting purely localized knowledge spillovers and η = 1
corresponding to the case of global learning effects. As long as η < 1, the costs
of producing new capital units in each region thus depend on the interregional
distribution of capital. The foreign technology is isomorphic with a∗i (t) =
1
K∗(t)+ηK(t) . Following Romer (1990), there is no capital depreciation.
Demographic structure and preferences
As far as the demographic structure of our model economy is concerned, this
paper closely follows the framework of chapter 2 by adopting the overlapping
generation structure of Blanchard (1985). At each point in time, τ ∈ [0,∞),
a large cohort consisting of new individuals is born. These newborns re-
ceive no bequests and thus start their lives without any wealth. The size of
this cohort is N(τ, τ) = µN(τ), where µ > 0 is the constant birth rate and
N(τ) ≡ ∫ τ−∞N(t0, τ)dt0 is total population at time τ with N(t0, τ) denoting
the size of the cohort born at t0 for any given point in time τ .
5 Conse-
quently, cohorts can be distinguished by the birth date t0 of their members.
Since there is no heterogeneity between members of the same cohort, each
cohort can be described by one representative individual, who inelastically
supplies her efficiency units of labor on the labor market with perfect mo-
bility across sectors but immobility between regions. Each individual faces
3Romer (1990) e.g. rationalizes this assumption by referring to the non-rival nature of
knowledge.
4New capital units can be thus viewed as having two distinct components. On the one
hand, a new capital unit represents private knowledge of how to produce a new variety,
which can be sold in the form of a patent to a manufacturing firm. In this sense capital
is interregionally immobile. On the other hand, however, it also contains public knowl-
edge since it makes it easier to produce further capital units (imperfectly mobile spillover
component).
5In what follows the first time index of a variable will refer to the birth date, whereas
the second will indicate a certain point in time.
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lifetime uncertainty, i.e. her time of death is stochastic with an exponential
probability density function. In particular, the instantaneous probability of
death of each individual is also given by the age independent parameter µ.
This implies that population size is constant and can be normalized to one.6
Finally, as in Yaari (1965), a perfect life-insurance company offers actuarial
notes, which can be bought or sold by each individual and are canceled upon
the individual’s death.
The overlapping generation structure implies that the overall economy
does not feature one single representative individual. It is thus necessary to
aggregate over the cohorts to arrive at aggregate variables, e.g. aggregate
capital stock of the economy at a certain point in time t is defined as
K(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0, (4.2)
where k(t0, t) represents the individual capital stock.
Preferences over the agricultural good and a CES composite of the manu-
facturing varieties are Cobb-Douglas. In particular, expected lifetime utility
of a representative individual of cohort t0 at time t0
7 is given by
U(t0, t0) =
∫ ∞
t0
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t0) ln
[
(cz(t0, τ))
1−ξ(caggm (t0, τ))
ξ
]
dτ, (4.3)
where ρ > 0 is the pure rate of time preference, 0 < ξ < 1 is the manufac-
6From now on, we will refer to µ as the mortality rate. Note, however, that µ equiv-
alently represents the birth rate, e.g. demographic change as captured by variations in µ
means that both the mortality and the birth rate change by the same amount such that
population size remains constant. This also implies that we restrict attention to changes
in the population age structure (lower µ implies population aging) while neglecting varia-
tions in the population growth rate due to demographic change. In particular, emphasis is
put on comparing a situation that fully ignores demographic structures, i.e. where µ = 0,
to one that allows for them by considering nonzero mortality rates.
7Equation (4.3) can be easily derived by calculating expected lifetime utility where
the date of death is a random variable with an exponential probability density function
parameterized by a constant instantaneous mortality rate µ.
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turing share of consumption and
caggm (t0, τ) ≡
[∫ K(τ)
0
(
cHm(i, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(
cFm(j, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
represents consumption of the CES composite with σ > 1 denoting the elas-
ticity of substitution between varieties.
Capital accumulation
As outlined above, individual savings, defined as income minus consumption
expenditures, are converted into capital in the investment sector. The wealth
constraint of a representative individual can thus be written as
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
G(τ)
+ µk(t0, τ), (4.4)
where l refers to the efficiency units of labor an individual supplies and e(t0, τ)
are individual total expenditures for consumption defined as
e(t0, τ) ≡ pz(τ)cz(t0, τ) +
∫ K(τ)
0
pHm(i, τ)c
H
m(i, t0, τ)di+∫ K∗(τ)
0
pFm,ϕ(j, τ)c
F
m(j, t0, τ)dj.
Here pz(τ) is the price of the agricultural good, p
H
m(i, τ) the price of a manu-
factured variety produced at home and pFm,ϕ(j, τ) the price of a manufactured
variety produced abroad with the subscript ϕ indicating the dependence on
transport costs.
The particular law of motion for capital given in equation (4.4) is based
on the full insurance result of Yaari (1965) implying that all individuals only
hold their wealth in the form of actuarial notes, i.e. each individual itself first
converts her savings into capital and then leaves it to the insurance company.
Therefore, the market rate of return on capital, pi(τ)
G(τ)
, has to be augmented
by µ to obtain the fair rate on actuarial notes (see Yaari (1965)).
Using the demographic assumptions described above to substitute out
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N(t0, t) in equation (4.2), then differentiating with respect to t and substi-
tuting for k˙(t0, t) from equation (4.4) and for ai(t) from equation (4.1) yields
the aggregate law of motion of capital8
K˙(t) = [pi(t)K(t) + w(t)L− E(t)] K(t) + ηK
∗(t)
w(t)
, (4.5)
where aggregate consumption expenditures, E(t), are analogously defined to
the aggregate capital stock in equation (4.2).9 As outlined in chapter 2, the
aggregate capital accumulation equation does not feature the mortality rate
µ anymore. This is in sharp contrast to the law of motion for individual
capital and captures the fact that µK(t) does not represent aggregate cap-
ital accumulation but is a transfer - via the life insurance company - from
individuals who died to those who survived. Similarly, the corresponding law
of motion for the foreign capital stock is given by10
K˙∗(t) = [pi∗(t)K∗(t) + w∗(t)L− E∗(t)] K
∗(t) + ηK(t)
w∗(t)
. (4.6)
4.2.2 Short-run equilibrium
Analogously to Baldwin et al. (2001), consumers maximize utility, firms max-
imize profits and all goods and factor markets clear for given levels of K(t)
and K(t)∗ in the short-run equilibrium.
Utility maximization
The representative individual of cohort t0 chooses at each instant τ > t0
consumption of the agricultural good, cz(t0, τ), consumption of varieties pro-
duced at home, cHm(i, t0, τ), and consumption of varieties produced abroad,
cFm(j, t0, τ) to maximize expected lifetime utility given in equation (4.3) sub-
ject to the wealth constraint (4.4). This optimization problem can be solved
8For details of the aggregation procedure see chapter 2 and its appendix A.1.
9The aggregate efficiency units of labor L are equal to the individual supply l since
population size is normalized to one.
10Note that L = L∗ due to symmetry between regions.
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by applying a three stage procedure.11 In the first stage the dynamic saving-
consumption decision is analyzed which yields the individual Euler equation
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
G(τ)
− ρ+ G˙(τ)
G(τ)
. (4.7)
Note that to each individual the labor input coefficient ai(τ) and thus the
marginal cost of investment in new capital units, G(τ) ≡ ai(τ)w(τ), is a
parameter. This means that the saving decision’s impact on the aggregate
capital stock and thus on ai(τ) is not taken into account, i.e. no internaliza-
tion of the knowledge spillover takes place.
To arrive at the law of motion for aggregate consumption expenditures
E(t) it is necessary to again “sum” over all cohorts.12 This yields the “ag-
gregate Euler equation” of the economy
E˙(t)
E(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)G(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
e˙(t0, t)
e(t0, t)
, (4.8)
where individual expenditure growth, e˙(t0,τ)
e(t0,τ)
, is given in equation (4.7). As
described in detail in chapter 2, the difference between individual and ag-
gregate savings behavior is captured by a correction term representing the
distributional effects due to the turnover of generations. In particular, ag-
gregate expenditure growth falls short of individual growth as wealthy old
individuals with high expenditure levels are continually replaced by newborns
with no capital holdings and thus low expenditure levels. Analogously, the
corresponding law of motion for the foreign region is given by13
E˙∗(t)
E∗(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)G∗(t)K
∗(t)
E∗(t)
+
e˙∗(t0, t)
e∗(t0, t)
. (4.9)
Stage two and three of the individual optimization problem finally deal
with the static consumption allocation between the CES composite and the
agricultural good as well as the allocation of consumption to each of the man-
11For details see again chapter 2 and its appendix A.1.
12For details see again chapter 2 and its appendix A.1.
13Note that µ = µ∗ and ρ = ρ∗ due to symmetry between regions.
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ufactured varieties. Altogether this leads to the following demand functions
for the agricultural good and for each of the manufactured varieties
cz(t0, τ) =
(1− ξ)e(t0, τ)
pz(τ)
, (4.10)
cHm(i, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(p
H
m(i, τ))
−σ[∫ K(τ)
0
(pHm(i, τ))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
1−σdj
] ,(4.11)
cFm(j, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))
−σ[∫ K(τ)
0
(pHm(i, τ))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗(τ)
0
(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
1−σdj
] .(4.12)
Profit maximization
Marginal cost pricing in the perfectly competitive agricultural sector and
perfect labor mobility across sectors implies that the equilibrium wage rate
in the economy is pinned down by the price of the agricultural good. As
free trade between home and foreign equalizes this price, wages also equalize
between the two regions as long as each of them produces some agricultural
output which will be assumed from now on.14 Finally, choosing the agricul-
tural good as nume´raire leads to
w(t) = w∗(t) = 1. (4.13)
Manufacturing firm’s profit maximization yields the familiar rule that
prices are equal to a constant markup over marginal costs15
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)am, (4.14)
pFm,ϕ(i, t) = p
H
m(i, t)ϕ. (4.15)
Mill pricing is optimal, i.e. the only difference between prices in the two
regions is due to transport costs (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Free entry into the manufacturing sector drives pure profits down to zero
which implies that the capital rental rate must equal the operating profit
14See Baldwin (1999) for details on this assumption.
15For details of the derivations see again chapter 2 and its appendix A.1.
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of each manufacturing firm. Using optimal prices given in equations (4.14)
and (4.15) together with equations (4.11) and (4.12) and redefining global
quantities and regional share variables gives operating profits and thus capital
rental rates as16
pi = Bias
(
ξEW
σKW
)
; Bias ≡
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)
,
(4.16)
pi∗ = Bias∗
(
ξEW
σKW
)
; Bias∗ ≡
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)
,
(4.17)
where φ ≡ ϕ1−σ is a measure of openness between the two regions with
φ = 0 indicating prohibitive trade barriers and φ = 1 free trade. World
expenditures are defined as EW ≡ E + E∗ and the world capital stock as
KW ≡ K + K∗ with θK and θE being the respective home shares of these
quantities, i.e. θK ≡ KKW and θE ≡ EEW . The terms labeled Bias and Bias∗
can be interpreted as the bias in national sales, i.e. Bias measures the extent
to which a home variety’s sales (σpi) differ from the world average sales per
variety ( ξE
W
KW
).
The evolution of the economy
Combining the intermediate results of utility and profit maximization yields
a system of three differential equations in E, E∗ and θK that fully describes
the evolution of the economy. By substituting for ai from equation (4.1) and
for K˙ and K˙∗ from equations (4.5) and (4.6) and by imposing the equilib-
rium wage rate from equation (4.13) as well as the capital rental rates from
equations (4.16) and (4.17), the aggregate Euler equations given in (4.8) and
16Time arguments are ignored from now on. Note, moreover, that ξ = ξ∗ and σ = σ∗
due to symmetry between regions. For further details of the derivations see again chapter
2 and its appendix A.1.
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(4.9) can be rewritten as
E˙
E
= −µ(ρ+ µ) θK
AE
− (1 + ηA
∗
A
)L+ (E + η
A∗
A
E∗)− ρ
+
ξ
σ
(E + E∗)
[
(A− θK)Bias− ηA
∗
A
(1− θK)Bias∗
]
, (4.18)
E˙∗
E∗
= −µ(ρ+ µ)1− θK
A∗E∗
− (1 + η A
A∗
)L+ (E∗ + η
A
A∗
E)− ρ
+
ξ
σ
(E + E∗)
[
(A∗ − (1− θK))Bias∗ − η A
A∗
θKBias
]
, (4.19)
where A ≡ θK + η(1− θK) such that ai = 1KWA and analogously for A∗.
The law of motion of θK is obtained by differentiating the definition of
this share variable with respect to time and then substituting for K˙ and K˙∗
from equations (4.5) and (4.6) which yields
θ˙K = θK(1− θK)
(
K˙
K
− K˙
∗
K∗
)
= (1− θK)A[L+ σ
ξ
(E + E∗)θKBias− E]
−θKA∗[L+ σ
ξ
(E + E∗)(1− θK)Bias∗ − E∗], (4.20)
where again the equilibrium wage rate from equation (4.13) as well as the
capital rental rate from equation (4.16) is imposed.
The remaining sections 4.3 and 4.4 will analyze this three-dimensional
dynamic system (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20) more thoroughly to identify the
channels via which the demographic parameter µ impacts upon both the
steady-state growth rates and the stability properties of the symmetric equi-
librium. Similarly to the framework of chapter 2, the incorporation of over-
lapping generations and lifetime uncertainty affects the system only via the
turnover correction terms in the aggregate Euler equations. This already
emphasizes the central role the generational turnover will play for the rela-
tionship between demographic change and agglomeration tendencies. Note,
moreover, that setting µ = 0, i.e. considering the case of an infinitely lived
representative agent, yields the laws of motion obtained by Baldwin et al.
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(2001). The framework developed in this paper thus nests their model, which
fully ignores demographic structures, as a special case.
4.3 Long-run equilibrium
A long-run equilibrium is characterized by the steady-state values E¯, E¯∗ and
θ¯K for which E˙ = E˙∗ = ˙θK = 0. Due to the nonlinearities arising from the
turnover term in the aggregate Euler equations, one cannot solve for all equi-
libria analytically. Numerical investigations, however, reveal an equilibrium
pattern similar to Baldwin et al. (2001). Before presenting these results, sub-
section 4.3.1 analytically characterizes the symmetric interior equilibrium as
well as the core-periphery outcome.17
4.3.1 Lifetime uncertainty in the symmetric and core-
periphery equilibrium - Is agglomeration pro-
growth?
Inserting the symmetric outcome with θK = 0.5 and E = E
∗ into the three-
dimensional system reveals that it is indeed a steady state with the equilib-
rium level of expenditures given by18
E¯sym = E¯
∗
sym =
L(1 + η) + ρ+
√
(L(1 + η)+ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)
2(1 + η)
(4.21)
Equation (4.21) clearly shows that aggregate expenditures in the symmetric
equilibrium increase in the mortality rate. This is fully consistent with the
findings in the framework without spillovers presented in chapter 2, where the
positive dependence has, however, only been shown numerically.19 The above
17These and most other results were derived with Mathematica. The corresponding files
are available from the author upon request.
18Solving the system for the symmetric equilibrium value of expenditures in fact yielded
two solutions. Attention is restricted to the economically meaningful one.
19Surprisingly, the introduction of endogenous growth into the benchmark model of
chapter 2 substantially simplifies the dynamic system describing the evolution of the econ-
omy and thus allows for more analytical results.
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result moreover indicates that the mortality rate influences consumption ex-
penditures primarily via its effect on discounting, i.e. a higher mortality rate
increases expenditure levels of individuals. This “discount channel” domi-
nates the “age structure based channel”. The latter captures the effect of
the mortality rate on the age composition of the population and implies a
negative dependence since a higher mortality rate increases the proportion of
poor and young individuals with low expenditure levels to wealthy and old
individuals with higher expenditure levels (see chapter 2 for details).
The growth rate, defined as g ≡ K˙
K
, in the symmetric equilibrium can be
obtained from equation (4.5) by using the equilibrium level of expenditures
of equation (4.21) and simplifying. It is given by
g¯sym = g¯
∗
sym = (1 + η)[L−
σ − ξ
σ
E¯sym]
= (1 + η)L− (σ − ξ)
2σ
[L(1 + η) + ρ+
√
(L(1 + η)+ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)].
(4.22)
Investigating the dependence of this growth rate on the mortality rate im-
mediately yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium growth rate in the symmetric equilibrium
decreases in the mortality rate.
Proof. The derivative of the growth rate with respect to mortality is
∂g¯sym
∂µ
= − (σ − ξ)(2µ+ ρ)
σ
√
(L(1 + η)+ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)
< 0,
since σ > ξ.
This finding is fully consistent with Prettner (2009) who investigates the
consequences of varying mortality rates for growth perspectives in a one-
region endogenous growth model in the spirit of Romer (1990). The negative
effect of the mortality rate on the growth rate works via the increased level
of equilibrium expenditures (see equation (4.21)). If individuals face lifetime
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uncertainty, available resources are more heavily used for current consump-
tion purposes than for investment in capital and thus new varieties. This is
due to the fact that future is discounted more strongly and thus investment
in future growth prospects becomes less important.
Similar findings also apply to the core-periphery outcome.20 First, for a
threshold value of the mortality rate of
µcp =
−ρ+
√(
(L+ρ)(σ−ξ(φη−1))+2Lξ(1− η
φ
)
σ+ξ(φη−1)
)2
− (L2 + 2Lρ)
2
(4.23)
accumulation of capital in only one region, i.e. θK = 1, can be shown to
be a steady state of three-dimensional system21 with associated expenditure
levels
E¯cp =
(L+ ρ) +
√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
2
, E¯∗cp = L. (4.24)
Whereas equilibrium expenditures at home again increase in the mortality
rate, the foreign expenditure level is of course independent of the mortality
rate since, even with infinitely lived individuals, all available resources are
immediately used for consumption purposes. The growth rate in the core-
periphery equilibrium is finally obtained by combining equation (4.5) with
the core-periphery expenditure levels of (4.24) which yields
g¯cp =
σ + ξ
σ
L− σ − ξ
σ
E¯cp
=
(3ξ + σ)L− (σ − ξ)(ρ+√(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ))
2σ
. (4.25)
Analogously to the symmetric equilibrium, the impact of lifetime uncertainty
on this growth rate can be immediately summarized in the following propo-
20Here only the θK = 1 case is considered. Using symmetry between the regions,
analogous results can be shown to hold for θK = 0.
21Following Baldwin et al. (2001), who investigate the equilibria of the model for varying
trade cost levels instead of mortality rates, one can thus conclude that for all µ ≤ µcp the
core-periphery outcome θK = 1 represents a long-run equilibrium. This follows from
taking into account the boundary condition 0 ≤ θK ≤ 1.
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sition.
Proposition 4.2. The equilibrium growth rate in the core-periphery equilib-
rium decreases in the mortality rate.
Proof. The derivative of the growth rate with respect to mortality is
∂g¯cp
∂µ
= − (σ − ξ)(2µ+ ρ)
σ
√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
< 0,
since σ > ξ.
As in the symmetric equilibrium, a positive mortality rate decreases the
equilibrium growth rate via its positive impact upon equilibrium home ex-
penditures.
Although the mortality rate has the same qualitative effect on the growth
rates in the symmetric and core-periphery equilibrium, its quantitative im-
pact differs. This has crucial implications for the growth rate differential
between the symmetric and the core-periphery equilibrium.22 Baldwin et al.
(2001) show that in their model with infinitely lived individuals the core-
periphery growth rate exceeds the growth rate in the symmetric equilibrium
as long as spillovers are localized, i.e. η < 1. In the case of global spillovers
the growth rates equalize which is intuitive since there is no spillover gain
from agglomeration of innovative activity. Agglomeration is thus pro-growth
unless interregional learning externalities are perfect. Surprisingly, the intro-
duction of overlapping generation structures and lifetime uncertainty qualifies
this finding. In particular, for the case of global spillovers, i.e. η = 1, the
growth rate differential is given by
g¯cp − g¯sym|η=1 = σ − ξ
2σ
√
(2L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)− L
−σ − ξ
2σ
√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ). (4.26)
22Note that in both equilibria steady-state growth in real income is equalized across
regions. This is due to the fact that real income growth is driven by the steady decrease
in the price index along the growth path which itself results from the growing number of
worldwide varieties KW (see Baldwin et al. (2001)).
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Figure 4.1: The growth rate differential g¯cp − g¯sym for varying µ and η
It is easily verified that g¯cp − g¯sym|η=1 for µ = 0 and that this differential
decreases in the mortality rate. Consequently, with lifetime uncertainty, the
core-periphery outcome even features a smaller growth rate than the sym-
metric equilibrium for the case of fully globalized spillovers. The growth ad-
vantage of the symmetric equilibrium resulting from the possibility of death
is, however, dampened the more spillovers are localized. This follows from
noting that the growth rate in the symmetric equilibrium is smaller the more
spillovers are localized, i.e. the lower is η, whereas the rate in the core-
periphery outcome is independent of the spillover parameter. Figure 4.1
illustrates these findings by plotting the level curves of the growth rate dif-
ferential g¯cp − g¯sym for varying mortality rates and degrees of interregional
spillovers given the parameter values ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4, L = 1.
In sharp contrast to standard NEG growth models (see e.g. Baldwin and
Martin (2004) for an overview), figure 4.1 nicely shows that even in the case
of localized spillovers the symmetric equilibrium’s growth rate can exceed
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the core-periphery’s one, e.g. for η = 0.9, mortality rates above 0.127 would
imply a negative differential. These observations are summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 4.3. The growth rate differential g¯cp − g¯sym decreases in the
mortality rate with the decrease being dampened the more spillovers are lo-
calized.
Proof.
∂(g¯cp − g¯sym)
∂µ
=
(σ − ξ)(2µ+ ρ)
σ
×
×
(
1√
(L(1 + η) + ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
− 1√
(L+ ρ)2 + 4µ(ρ+ µ)
)
≤ 0,
since η ≥ 0 makes the term in brackets nonpositive and σ > ξ. Clearly, the
above derivative decreases in η which proves the second part of the proposi-
tion.
In a setting with lifetime uncertainty, spatial agglomeration is thus not
necessarily conducive to growth. The intuition for this result becomes clear
when looking more thoroughly at the impact of lifetime uncertainty on the
growth rates in the symmetric and core-periphery outcome. In general, when
spillovers are localized, agglomeration of innovative activity makes innova-
tion cheaper and thus results in higher growth rates. A positive mortality
rate, however, countervails this pro-growth effect of spatial agglomeration.
In particular, it has a less negative effect on the growth rate in the symmet-
ric equilibrium than in the core-periphery equilibrium if spillovers are not
purely local. This can be easily seen by comparing the derivatives of the
growth rates with respect to the mortality rate in the proofs of propositions
4.1 and 4.2 which, as the proof of proposition 4.3 also shows, only equalize
for η = 0. Intuitively, in the symmetric equilibrium with some knowledge
spillovers from the other region, the decrease in saving incentives due to a
higher mortality rate is not as unfavorable for the economy’s growth rate as
in the core-periphery equilibrium with full concentration of innovative activ-
ity. The reason is that spillovers from the other region increase productivity
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in the innovation sector such that it is ceteris paribus more attractive to
use resources for investment purposes than for current consumption. Since
this effect is, however, only present in the symmetric equilibrium, a positive
mortality rate decreases equilibrium expenditures less in the symmetric than
in the core-periphery equilibrium and thus has a lower negative effect on the
growth rate.
4.3.2 Interior asymmetric equilibria
As already mentioned, deriving analytical expressions for all steady states
is too cumbersome. It is, however, possible to reduce the system of three
equilibrium equations in three variables, i.e. E˙ = E˙∗ = ˙θK = 0, to one
equation in θK , whose roots represent all long-run equilibria. Numerically
investigating this equation reveals that for a small range of mortality rates,
in particular as soon as the threshold value µcp is passed, the core-periphery
equilibria turn into interior asymmetric equilibria. The following figure 4.2
illustrates these equilibrium characteristics by plotting the steady states of
the system as a function of µ.23 It clearly indicates that there exist, at least
for a small range of mortality rates, interior equilibria with an unequal dis-
tribution of capital across regions which are symmetric around the persistent
steady state θK = 0.5. Similar to Baldwin et al. (2001), figure 4.2 is highly
reminiscent of a pitchfork bifurcation. The following section will provide ad-
ditional evidence for the existence of a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation by
illustrating that the symmetric equilibrium loses its stability as soon as the
two interior asymmetric equilibria appear.
4.4 The joint effect of demographic change
and spillovers on agglomeration
Figure 4.2 shows the existence of long-run equilibria that are characterized
by an unequal distribution of capital. Whether such an agglomeration of
23Note that for the parameter values used, i.e. ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4, L = 1, η = 0.5
and φ = 0.9, µcp = 0.285455.
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Figure 4.2: Steady-state values of θK as a function of µ
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economic activity takes place crucially depends on the stability properties of
the symmetric equilibrium. If it turns out that this steady state is unstable,
any slight perturbation of the symmetric outcome triggers agglomeration
processes that might result in either the asymmetric interior or the core-
periphery equilibria.
In general, NEG models focus on the role of changing trade costs for the
emergence of spatial structures, i.e. they show how economic integration
lowering the costs of trading goods leads to concentration of economic ac-
tivity. Other features of the economy could, however, be similarly decisive
for agglomeration processes. Chapter 2 has shown that the adoption of an
overlapping generation structure with lifetime uncertainty, i.e. increasing µ
above zero, considerably reduces the possibility of the symmetric equilibrium
to be unstable in the constructed capital framework of Baldwin (1999). The
main question to be investigated in this section is whether an analogous find-
ing also holds in a setting with endogenous growth due to learning spillovers.
In particular, it is of interest how demographic structures interact with the
additional growth-linked circular causality resulting from the incorporation
of knowledge spillovers in the investment sector. Finally, it is worth investi-
gating the role of lifetime uncertainty in the selection among the asymmetric
equilibria, i.e. how it influences the importance of initial conditions relative
to expectations in choosing the region where agglomeration takes place.
4.4.1 Formal stability analysis
The stability properties of the symmetric long-run equilibrium are analyzed
by following the classical approach (see e.g. the appendix on mathematical
methods in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)) of linearizing the non-linear dy-
namic system (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20)24 around the symmetric equilibrium
and then by evaluating the eigenvalues of the corresponding 3× 3 Jacobian
24Equations (4.18) and (4.19) were multiplied by E or E∗ to obtain E˙ and E˙∗.
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matrix  j11 j12 j13j12 j11 −j13
j31 −j31 j33,
 (4.27)
whose entries are given in appendix A.3.1. Solving the characteristic equation
yields the following three eigenvalues
eig1 =
√
L2(η + 1)2 + 2Lρ(η + 1) + (2µ+ ρ)2, (4.28)
eig2 =
1
2(η + 1)(φ+ 1)2σ
(r −
√
rad), (4.29)
eig3 =
1
2(η + 1)(φ+ 1)2σ
(r +
√
rad), (4.30)
where
r ≡ (−2Lη + eig1)((η + 1)(φ+ 1)2σ)− 2φ(ηφ− 1)Qξ,
rad ≡ (((η − 1)eig1 + 2ηρ)σ(φ+ 1)2 + 2(φ− η)Qξ)2
−8η(η + 1)(φ+ 1)3σ((φ+ 1)σ + (φ− 1)ξ)×
×
Q
(
−Lη2 + L+ 12Q
(
η − 2(ηφ
2−2φ+η)ξ
(φ+1)2σ
− 1
))
2(η + 1)
− µ(µ+ ρ)
 ,
with the parameter cluster Q ≡ L(η + 1) + eig1 + ρ. The signs and nature
of these eigenvalues fully characterize the system’s local dynamics around
the symmetric equilibrium. Since there are two jump variables E and E∗,
stability requires at least one eigenvalue to be negative. In particular, saddle
path stability prevails if one out of the three eigenvalues is negative.
First it is easily established that eigenvalue 1 is always real and positive
for all possible parameter values.25 As far as the remaining two eigenvalues
are concerned things turn out to be more complicated. Checking rad for
various parameter specifications shows that it changes sign, i.e. one must
differentiate between the case where eigenvalues 2 and 3 are real and the
25Recall the parameter ranges σ > 1, ρ > 0, µ > 0, 0 < ξ < 1 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
and L > 0 which also imply that Q > 0.
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case where they are complex. In both cases stability properties crucially
depend on the sign of r. Since (−2Lη + eig1) > 0 and (ηφ − 1) ≤ 0 r is
unambiguously positive for all possible parameter ranges.
4.4.2 The case of real eigenvalues - The opposing sta-
bility effects of demography and spillovers
With real eigenvalues, r > 0 immediately implies that eigenvalue 3 is also
positive resulting in lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. For the case of real eigenvalues, i.e. rad > 0, eigenvalue 2
is decisive for the local stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium. A
positive eigenvalue 2 implies instability, a negative one saddle path stability.
Proof. See above arguing.
Lemma 4.1 implies that changes in the mortality rate can only influence
the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium via eigenvalue 2. Nu-
merically investigating this eigenvalue immediately results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.4. The possibility of agglomeration crucially hinges on the
mortality rate.
Proof. Figure 4.326, which plots eigenvalue 2 as a function of the mortal-
ity rate for an intermediate level of interregional spillovers η = 0.5 and for
three different levels of economic integration, clearly reveals that eigenvalue
2 switches sign depending on the mortality rate.
Proposition 4.4 verifies the crucial importance of demographic structures
for agglomeration processes found in chapter 2 also for a setting that addi-
tionally allows for endogenous growth due to learning spillovers. Figure 4.3,
however, does not only show this decisive role of the mortality rate but also
reconfirms the stabilizing effect of introducing overlapping generations and
lifetime uncertainty. Consistent with the findings in chapter 2, eigenvalue 2
26Figure 4.3 is again plotted for ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 and L = 1.
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Figure 4.3: Eigenvalue 2 as a function of µ
decreases in the mortality rate, i.e. only for sufficiently low mortality rates
agglomeration processes may set in. In the framework of chapter 2 without
knowledge spillovers, this stabilizing effect even implied that for plausible
parameter values instability could never occur. In particular, it was shown
that for mortality rates corresponding to life expectancies of less than ap-
proximately 3500 years27 the symmetric equilibrium was stable for all levels
of economic integration.28 This is in sharp contrast to the present setting
with endogenous growth due to learning effects. Indeed, figure 4.3 clearly
indicates that agglomeration is still a fully possible outcome. It shows that
for a rather low level of trade openness φ = 0.3, the critical mortality rate
µbreak below which eigenvalue 2 is positive and thus the symmetric equilib-
rium unstable29 is 0.109. This corresponds to a life expectancy of only 9
27Since the probability of death during each year equals µ, average life expectancy is 1µ .
28This holds for the most plausible choice of parameter values made in chapter 2, i.e.
ρ = 0.015, δ = 0.05, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4. Setting δ = 0 as in this setting only insignificantly
reduces this life expectancy threshold value.
29The analytical expression for µbreak is too unwieldy to report. The Mathematica file
deriving it is available upon request.
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years, which illustrates that, in contrast to the framework of chapter 2, a
plausible choice of parameter values does not eliminate the possibility of ag-
glomeration of economic activity even though we allow for nonzero mortality
rates. Summarizing, the findings so far imply that, although the introduc-
tion of overlapping generations still acts as a dispersion force in a NEG model
with endogenous growth, its impacts are, in general, not strong enough to
prevent regions from unequal development.
The intuition for this result is simple. It is based on the existence of two
countervailing effects which would not be present in a setting without learn-
ing spillovers and ignoring demographic structures. In particular, whether
agglomeration takes place in this model economy depends on the relative
strength of four distinct agglomeration or dispersion forces. Each of them
captures how an exogenous increase of the capital share impacts upon the
rate of capital accumulation. If it raises it, agglomeration of capital takes
place since a circular causality sets in. Otherwise, the decreased capital ac-
cumulation rate acts as a self-correcting force promoting dispersion rather
than concentration of economic activity.
First, there are two forces that are neither linked to the demographic
structure nor to the spillover specification. These are the standard anti-
agglomerative local competition effect and the pro-agglomerative demand-
linked circular causality first introduced by Baldwin (1999). The latter shows
that a higher share of capital in one region increases expenditures and thus
operating profits, i.e. capital rental rates, which speeds up capital accu-
mulation. The former, on the other hand, captures the negative impact of
agglomeration of capital, i.e. firms, on capital rental rates due to more severe
competition. Both of these forces are, however, not the channels via which
the mortality rate on the one hand and learning spillovers on the other hand
impact upon the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium.
The particular channel via which demography influences agglomeration
processes has already been identified in chapter 2 as the anti-agglomerative
turnover effect. An exogenous rise in the home capital share increases wealth
and thus expenditure levels of individuals being currently alive in the home
region relative to foreign-based individuals. The negative distributional ef-
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fects on aggregate expenditures resulting from death, i.e. the replacement
of these individuals by newborns whose consumption expenditures are lower
since they have zero wealth levels, are thus more pronounced in the home
region. This, in turn, decreases the home expenditure share and therefore
relative profitability and the relative capital rental rate.
Finally, the impact of learning spillovers on the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium are captured by the growth-linked circular causality
introduced by Martin and Ottaviano (1999). If learning spillovers are local-
ized, a higher share of capital in the home region lowers the marginal cost of
producing new capital relative to the foreign region (see equation 4.1) and
thus strengthens capital accumulation. Endogenous growth is thus a power-
ful destabilizing force that mitigates the stabilizing effect of the turnover of
generations. The strength of this growth-linked circular causality crucially
depends on the degree of localization of spillovers. As can be seen in figure
4.430, which plots the zero level curve of eigenvalue 2, i.e. the dividing line
between stability and instability, for three different levels of trade openness,
agglomeration is fostered the more learning externalities are localized. In
particular, with no learning spillovers across regions, i.e. η = 0, eigenvalue
2 is positive for all possible parameter ranges and the system is always un-
stable. Figure 4.4, however, also illustrates the stabilizing effect of increased
interregional spillovers. For a given mortality rate of e.g. 0.0125 resulting in
a life expectancy of 80 years and intermediate trade openness levels φ = 0.5,
fostering interregional knowledge spillovers above a level of about 0.8 could
still prevent regions from unequal development. The strength of this stabi-
lizing effect of knowledge spillovers becomes clear if one considers the case
of globalized learning effects, i.e. η = 1. In this case the symmetric equi-
librium is stable for all levels of trade costs as long as individuals face a life
expectancy of less than approximately 3600 years, i.e. as in the framework
presented in chapter 2 agglomeration of economic activity does not occur for
plausible parameter values.
Last but not least, the stability findings of this section also provide addi-
tional evidence that the dynamic system undergoes a supercritical pitchfork
30Figure 4.4 is again plotted for ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 and L = 1.
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Figure 4.4: Symmetric equilibrium stability map
bifurcation as the mortality rate crosses a certain threshold value. In partic-
ular, for the parameter values of figure 4.2, the critical mortality rate µbreak
at which the symmetric equilibrium loses stability is 0.313. As can be seen
from figure 4.2, this value exactly coincides with the threshold mortality rate
where the two interior asymmetric steady states, that finally turn into the
core-periphery equilibria, show up. Following Baldwin (2001), one can thus
conclude that as soon as the mortality rate crosses µbreak from above, the
symmetric steady state loses its stability to the two appearing neighboring
asymmetric interior steady states. The question which out of these two equi-
libria will then be reached, i.e. in which region agglomeration will take place,
is briefly addressed in the next subsection.
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4.4.3 The case of complex eigenvalues - Lifetime un-
certainty and the history-versus-expectations de-
bate
The analysis so far has shown that nonzero mortality rates foster a more equal
distribution of economic activity due to the turnover of generations. With
complex eigenvalues, i.e. rad < 0, the symmetric equilibrium is, however,
always unstable since r is unambiguously positive for all possible parameter
ranges. As will become clear, the mortality rate nonetheless plays a decisive
role for the dynamics of the system by influencing the dividing line between
the case of monotone divergence, that occurs for a positive real eigenvalue 2,
and the case of diverging oscillations resulting from complex eigenvalues.
Krugman (1991a)31 shows that in the first situation history, represented
by initial conditions, is the crucial factor with respect to equilibrium selection,
whereas in the latter self-fulfilling expectations might also be decisive. In
particular, as long as all eigenvalues are real, agglomeration of capital will
take place in the region with the initially larger share of capital. In the case of
complex eigenvalues, on the other hand, equilibrium paths overlap such that
there exists a range around the symmetric equilibrium, where a given initial
distribution of capital corresponds to paths each leading to agglomeration in
a different region and expectations determine which path is chosen. Since
the parameters of the model determine whether there are complex or real
eigenvalues it is perfectly possible to investigate the role of the mortality
rate with respect to such history-versus-expectations considerations.
According to Baldwin (2001), a sufficient condition for there to be some
overlap of saddle paths is that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at
the unstable equilibrium are complex, i.e. rad < 0. Checking the depen-
dence of rad on µ reveals that lifetime uncertainty strengthens the role of
initial conditions in choosing among the multiple long-run equilibria. This is
summarized in proposition 4.5.
31Baldwin (2001) gives a nice overview over the history-versus-expectations debate in
NEG models initiated by Krugman (1991a).
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Proposition 4.5. The possibility of self-fulfilling expectations rather than
initial conditions being decisive for equilibrium selection arises only for suf-
ficiently low mortality rates.
Proof. Using Mathematica it can be shown that ∂rad
∂µ
≥ 0 for all possible
parameter ranges.32
Intuitively, a higher mortality rate implies that individuals discount the
future more heavily. This impatience means that they do not care too much
about expected profitability of capital accumulation which itself depends on
the future investment decisions of other individuals (recall that a region’s
relative attractiveness with respect to capital accumulation depends on its
capital share). But this is exactly one main reason why expectations could
be important. If everyone expects that investment will mainly take place
in the home region, then this increases the attractiveness of also investing
there independently of the current situation, i.e. independent of the relative
investment profitability in the initial condition. With low patience such
considerations about future investment returns lose, however, importance
and it is rather the current relative returns that are decisive.
Finally, numerically investigating the parameter region in which rad < 033
more thoroughly reveals that the possibility of expectations to be decisive
for equilibrium selection in our model is, in general, rather low. For the
parameter values of figure 4.2 e.g., the eigenvalues are real for all levels of
the mortality rate. Figure 4.5, which replicates, for varying mortality rates
and spillovers, the dividing line between stability and instability of figure
4.4 and additionally shows the level curve where rad = 0, i.e. the divid-
ing line between monotone divergence and diverging oscillations, indicates a
similar conclusion. The area inside the instability region featuring diverging
oscillations instead of monotonic divergence is relatively small. This again
emphasizes the subordinate role of expectations in answering the question in
which region agglomeration will take place.
32 ∂rad
∂µ is too cumbersome to be revealing. The calculations are available upon request.
33Note that the threshold value µreal, obtained from setting rad = 0, below which there
are complex eigenvalues, is lower than µbreak, obtained from setting eigenvalue 2 equal to
zero, i.e. r =
√
rad, since r > 0 and rad has been shown to increase in µ.
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Figure 4.5: The subordinate role of expectations relative to initial conditions
for equilibrium selection
4.5 Concluding remarks
By incorporating an overlapping generation structure and lifetime uncer-
tainty into a NEG model that features endogenous growth through learning
externalities, this paper has shed further light on whether and how demo-
graphic structures impact upon the spatial distribution of economic activity.
In doing so, it moreover gives deeper insights on how lifetime uncertainty af-
fects the long-run equilibrium growth perspectives of the symmetric relative
to the core-periphery outcome.
The main results are twofold. First, consistent with the findings in chap-
ter 2, nonzero mortality rates resulting in age-dependent heterogeneity of
individuals support a more equal distribution of productive factors by in-
troducing an additional dispersion force that countervails the agglomeration
tendencies resulting from endogenous growth through knowledge spillovers.
In particular, if interregional knowledge spillovers are sufficiently encouraged
across regions, the turnover of generations can even prevent regions from
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unequal development. Moreover, the possibility of agglomeration being the
result of a self-fulfilling prophecy is substantially reduced when considering
individuals who face a positive probability of death. Second, lifetime uncer-
tainty lowers both the symmetric equilibrium’s as well as the core-periphery
outcome’s growth rate. As long as learning spillovers are not purely local-
ized, this decrease is, however, more pronounced for the latter one. Thus,
in sharp contrast to existing NEG growth models with localized knowledge
spillovers, spatial concentration of economic activity is not necessarily con-
ducive to growth if one takes into account demographic structures. This also
implies that there might not be any trade-off between fostering an equal dis-
tribution of productive factors and high economic growth which would result
from e.g. increased economic integration if agglomeration were unambigu-
ously pro-growth.
Due to analytical tractability, the present framework still draws a very
simplified picture of reality. The model could, however, be easily extended to
investigate further relevant issues related to the interaction between agglom-
eration, growth and demography. What happens if regions are asymmetric
with respect to mortality rates or the degree of interregional spillovers? What
are the exact welfare implications of the results obtained so far? What are the
main differences, in particular with respect to growth rates, between partial
and full agglomeration equilibria, i.e. between the interior asymmetric and
the core-periphery steady states? These are only few questions that could
still be investigated more thoroughly within the model framework developed
in this paper.
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Appendix A
Technicalities
A.1 Chapter 2
A.1.1 The individual’s utility optimization problem
The first stage of the individual’s utility optimization problem deals with the
dynamic savings-expenditure decision. Suppressing time arguments in the
optimization procedure, the current value Hamiltonian for the individual’s
utility optimization problem is
H(e, k, λ, t) = ln
[ e
P
]
+ λ
(
wl + pik − e
wai
+ µk − δk
)
(A.1)
where P is the perfect price index translating expenditures into indirect
utility.1 The first order conditions of the problem associated with equation
(A.1) are given by
∂H
∂e
!
= 0 ⇒ 1
e
=
λ
aiw
, (A.2)
∂H
∂k
!
= (ρ+ µ)λ− λ˙ ⇒ λ˙
λ
= − pi
aiw
+ ρ+ δ, (A.3)
∂H
∂λ
!
= k˙ ⇒ wl + pik − e
wai
+ µk − δk = k˙ (A.4)
1This price index can be obtained from the solution to the optimization problem in
stage two and three.
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and the standard transversality condition. Taking the time derivative of
equation (A.2) under the assumption that w is time independent2 and com-
bining it with equation (A.3) yields the individual consumption Euler equa-
tion
e˙
e
=
pi
aiw
− δ − ρ.
In the second stage, the static problem of dividing consumption between
the manufacturing composite and the agricultural good for fixed consumption
expenditure e can be formulated as
max
caggm ,cz
(cz)
1−ξ(caggm )
ξ
s.t. pzcz + p
agg
m c
agg
m = e, (A.5)
where paggm is an appropriate price index which can be shown to equal a
weighted average of the two Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) price indexes at home
and foreign with the foreign price index being augmented by transport costs.
Setting up the Lagrangian
`(cz, c
agg
m , λa) = (cz)
1−ξ(caggm )
ξ + λa (e− pzcz − paggm caggm ) (A.6)
and solving for the first order conditions yields
∂`
∂cz
!
= 0 ⇒ (1− ξ)(cz)−ξ(caggm )ξ = λapz, (A.7)
∂`
∂caggm
!
= 0 ⇒ (cz)1−ξξ(caggm )ξ−1 = λapaggm , (A.8)
∂`
∂λa
!
= 0 ⇒ pzcz + paggm caggm = e. (A.9)
Manipulating these first order conditions leads to unit elastic demands for
the agricultural good and the CES composite of manufactured varieties given
2Section 2.2.4 shows that this indeed holds as the wage rate is pinned down by the
price of the agricultural good which is chosen to be the nume´raire of the economy.
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by
cz =
(1− ξ)e
pz
caggm =
ξe
paggm
. (A.10)
Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification of utility, a fraction ξ of income used
for consumption is spent on manufactures and a fraction 1 − ξ on the agri-
cultural good.
In the last stage, the static problem of distributing manufacturing con-
sumption among different varieties for fixed manufacturing consumption ex-
penditure ξe can be formulated as
max
cHm(i),c
F
m(j)
[∫ K
0
(
cHm(i)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(
cFm(j)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
s.t.
∫ K
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di+
∫ K∗
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj = ξe. (A.11)
Setting up the Lagrangian
`(cHm(i), c
F
m(j), λm) =
[∫ K
0
(
cHm(i)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(
cFm(j)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
+
λm
[
ξe−
∫ K
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di−
∫ K∗
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj
]
(A.12)
101
and solving for the first order conditions yields3
∂`
∂cHm(i)
!
= 0 ⇒ σ
σ − 1
[∫ K
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
] 1
σ−1
×σ − 1
σ
(cHm(i))
− 1
σ = λmp
H
m(i), (A.13)
∂`
∂cFm(j)
!
= 0 ⇒ σ
σ − 1
[∫ K
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
] 1
σ−1
×σ − 1
σ
(cFm(j))
− 1
σ = λmp
F
m,ϕ(j), (A.14)
∂`
∂λm
!
= 0 ⇒
∫ K
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di+
∫ K∗
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj = ξe. (A.15)
Recalling the definition of caggm given below equation (2.1), these first order
conditions can be rewritten as
caggm
[∫ K
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−1
(cHm(i))
− 1
σ = λmp
H
m(i),
(A.16)
caggm
[∫ K
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−1
(cFm(j))
− 1
σ = λmp
F
m,ϕ(j).
(A.17)
Isolating cHm(i) and c
F
m(j) on the left hand side, then multiplying both sides
3Note that this is in fact a variational problem.
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by pHm(i) or p
F
m,ϕ(j) and finally integrating over all varieties yields∫ K
0
pHm(i)c
H
m(i)di =
λ−σm
∫ K
0
(pHm(i))
1−σdi
[∫ K
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−σ
(caggm )−σ
,∫ K∗
0
pFm,ϕ(j)c
F
m(j)dj =
λ−σm
∫ K∗
0
(pFm,ϕ(j))
1−σdj
[∫ K
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
]−σ
(caggm )−σ
.
Adding these two expressions, using the budget constraint from above and
isolating λm gives the Lagrange multiplier
λm =
(ξe)−
1
σ caggm
[∫ K
0
(pHm(i))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗
0
(pFm,ϕ(j))
1−σdj
] 1
σ[∫ K
0
(cHm(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫ K∗
0
(cFm(j))
σ−1
σ dj
] , (A.18)
i.e. the shadow price of manufacturing consumption. Plugging this expres-
sion back into equations (A.16) and (A.17) finally leads to the demands for
all varieties
cHm(i) =
ξe(pHm(i))
−σ[∫ K
0
(pHm(i))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗
0
(pFm,ϕ(j))
1−σdj
] ,
cFm(j) =
ξe(pFm,ϕ(j))
−σ[∫ K
0
(pHm(i))
1−σdi+
∫ K∗
0
(pFm,ϕ(j))
1−σdj
] .
A.1.2 Aggregation over individuals
Following chapter 16 in Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002), the aggregate Euler
equation can be derived as follows. Taking the time derivative of aggregate
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consumption expenditures defined in equation (2.9) yields
E˙(t) = µe(t, t) + µ
∫ t
−∞
e˙(t0, t)e
−µ(t−t0) + e(t0, t)(−µ)e−µ(t−t0)dt0
= µe(t, t)− µE(t) + µ
∫ t
−∞
e˙(t0, t)e
−µ(t−t0)dt0, (A.19)
where we again used the definition of aggregate consumption expenditures in
going from the first to the second line. Before arriving at the final aggregate
Euler equation, it is necessary to derive optimal consumption expenditures
e(t, t) of newborns in the planning period t and the aggregate consumption
expenditure rule E(t). To achieve this, we reformulate the individual’s op-
timization problem as follows. In line with equation (2.1), expected utility
U(t0, t) at an arbitrary point in time t of a consumer born at time t0 ≤ t is
given by
U(t0, t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t) ln
(
e(t0, τ)
P (τ)
)
dτ, (A.20)
where we again used the perfect price index P translating expenditures in
indirect utility (see appendix A.1.1). The law of motion of capital given in
equation (2.2) can be rewritten as
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
+ µk(t0, τ)− δk(t0, τ)
=
(
pi(τ)
w(τ)ai
+ µ− δ
)
k(t0, τ) +
l
ai
− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
. (A.21)
From equation (A.21) the individual’s lifetime budget can be derived. First,
both sides of the equation are multiplied by e−R
A(t,τ) ≡ e−
∫ τ
t
(
pi(s)
w(s)ai
+µ−δ
)
ds
and rearranged to[
k˙(t0, τ)−
(
pi(τ)
w(τ)ai
+ µ− δ
)
k(t0, τ)
]
e−R
A(t,τ) =
[
l
ai
− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
]
e−R
A(t,τ).
(A.22)
Observing that the left hand side of equation (A.22) is d
[
k(t0, τ)e
−RA(t,τ)
]
/dτ
by applying the Leibniz rule to recognize that dRA(t, τ)/dτ = pi(τ)
w(τ)ai
+ µ− δ
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and integrating over the interval [t,∞) yields∫ ∞
t
d
[
k(t0, τ)e
−RA(t,τ)
]
=
∫ ∞
t
[
l
ai
− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
]
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ.
This expression can be solved to
lim
τ→∞
k(t0, τ)e
−RA(t,τ) − k(t0, t)e−RA(t,t) = h(t)−
∫ ∞
t
e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ,
(A.23)
where h(t) ≡ ∫∞
t
w(τ)l
w(τ)ai
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ denotes human wealth of individuals in
capital units consisting of the present value of lifetime wage income using
the annuity factor RA(t,τ) for discounting. Note that e−R
A(t,t) = 1 and that
the first term on the left hand side represents “terminal capital holdings”.
These holdings must be equal to zero because first, the insurance company
will ensure their nonnegativity, and second, it is suboptimal for an individual
to have positive terminal assets as there is neither a bequest motive nor
satiation from consumption. Taking this into account, yields the following
solvency condition
lim
τ→∞
e−R
A(t,τ)k(t0, τ) = 0, (A.24)
which prevents an individual from running a Ponzi game against the life-
insurance company. The No-Ponzi-Game condition can be inserted in equa-
tion (A.23) to obtain the individual’s lifetime budget restriction
k(t0, t) + h(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ. (A.25)
The present value of an individual’s consumption expenditure plan in capital
units must be equal to the sum of human wealth in capital units and cap-
ital holdings (=total wealth). Evaluating the lifetime budget constraint at
t = t0 shows that the discounted sum of lifetime labor earnings must equal
discounted consumption expenditures.4 This implies, from investigating the
law of motion of capital, that discounted savings are equal to discounted
accumulated profits, i.e. savings are only used for reallocating consumption
4Recall that capital holdings of newborns k(t0, t0) are zero by assumption (no bequests).
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across lifetime.
Maximizing expected utility given in equation (A.20) subject to the bud-
get constraint in equation (A.25) yields the following first order condition
1
e(t0, τ)
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t) = λ(t)
1
w(τ)ai
e−R
A(t,τ), τ ∈ [t,∞), (A.26)
where λ(t) represents the marginal expected lifetime utility of wealth.5 Indi-
viduals should therefore plan consumption expenditures in a way such that
the appropriately discounted marginal utility of expenditures and wealth are
equated.
Applying equation (A.26) to the planning period (τ = t) yields e(t0, t) =
w(t)ai
λ(t)
. Using this result and then substituting for λ(t) also from the first
order condition in equation (A.26) helps to establish the following equality∫ ∞
t
e(t0, t)e
−(ρ+µ)(τ−t)dτ =
∫ ∞
t
w(t)ai
λ(t)
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t)dτ
= aiw(t)
∫ ∞
t
e(t0, τ)
aiw(τ)
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ.
Integrating out and using the lifetime budget constraint of equation (A.25)
finally yields consumption expenditures e(t0, t) in the planning period t
e(t0, t)
ρ+ µ
[−e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t)]∞
t
= aiw(t)[k(t0, t) + h(t)]
e(t0, t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)[k(t0, t) + h(t)]. (A.28)
The above equation clearly shows that optimal consumption expenditures in
the planning period t in capital units, e(t0,t)
aiw(t)
, are proportional to total wealth
with the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth being constant
5Differentiating this first order condition with respect to τ , inserting the expression
for λ(t) also obtainable from this first order condition and simplifying yields the following
Euler equation
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
w(τ)ai
− ρ− δ + w˙(τ)
w(τ)
. (A.27)
With time-invariant wages (see section 2.2.4), this Euler equation is exactly the same as
the one obtained in equation (2.6).
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and equal to the effective rate of time preference ρ+ µ.
Using this expression for optimal consumption expenditures in the def-
inition of aggregate consumption expenditures in equation (2.9) yields the
following very simple aggregate consumption expenditure rule
E(t) ≡ µ
∫ t
−∞
e−µ(t−t0)(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)[k(t0, t) + h(t)]dt0
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)µ
[∫ t
−∞
e−µ(t−t0)k(t0, t)dt0 +
∫ t
−∞
e−µ(t−t0)h(t)dt0
]
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t) [K(t) + h(t)] , (A.29)
where the aggregate capital stock is defined in equation (2.7) and can be
rewritten in analogy to aggregate consumption expenditures in equation
(2.9). Moreover it is easily established that µh(t)
[
e−µ(t−t0)
µ
]t
−∞
= h(t).6
Finally, we modify equation (A.19) by substituting for e(t, t) and E(t)
from the derived expressions of equation (A.28) evaluated at birth date t7
and equation (A.29) as well as for e˙(t0, t) from the individual Euler equation
given in expression (A.27). Dividing by E(t) then gives the aggregate Euler
equation
E˙(t)
E(t)
= −µ(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
µ
E(t)
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− ρ− δ + w˙(t)
w(t)
]
e−µ(t−t0)dt0
= −µ(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)K(t)
E(t)
+
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− ρ− δ + w˙(t)
w(t)
= −µE(t)− e(t, t)
E(t)
+
e˙(t0, t)
e(t0, t)
,
where in the third line we used again the definition of aggregate consumption
expenditures from equation (2.9) and the term w˙(t)/w(t) disappears in the
6This aggregation property of consumption expenditures is due to the fact that we
assume a constant probability of death implying an age independent marginal propensity
to consume out of total wealth (see equation (A.28)).
7Note again that k(t, t) = 0 and newborns therefore consume a fraction of their human
wealth at birth, i.e. e(t, t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)h(t).
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case of time-invariant wages (see section 2.2.4).
A.1.3 The manufacturing firm’s profit maximization
problem - Derivation of rental rates
By substituting for optimal demands for varieties from the constraints of the
maximization problem as stated in equation (2.18), operating profit can be
rewritten as
(pHm(i, t)− w(t)am)
(∫ t
−∞
ξe(t0, t)(p
H
m(i, t))
−σ
Pm(t)
N(t0, t)dt0
)
+
(pFm,ϕ(i, t)− w(t)ϕam)
(∫ t
−∞
ξe∗(t0, t)(pFm,ϕ(i, t))
−σ
P ∗m(t)
N∗(t0, t)dt0
)
,
(A.30)
whose derivatives with respect to pHm(i, t) and p
F
m,ϕ(i, t) are set equal to zero
to yield the first order conditions∫ t
−∞ ξe(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0
Pm(t)
[
(1− σ)(pHm(i, t))−σ + σw(t)am(pHm(i, t))−σ−1
]
= 0,
∫ t
−∞ ξe
∗(t0, t)N∗(t0, t)dt0
P ∗m(t)
[
(1− σ)(pFm,ϕ(i, t))−σ + σw(t)amϕ(pFm,ϕ(i, t))−σ−1
]
= 0.
Rearranging and simplifying gives optimal prices
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)am,
pFm,ϕ(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)amϕ.
Using these pricing rules and the definition of aggregate expenditures given
in equation (2.8) in equation (A.30) and simplifying yields operating profits
as
pi(t) =
ξE(t)
σ(K(t) + ϕ1−σK∗(t))
+
ξϕ1−σE∗(t)
σ(ϕ1−σK(t) +K∗(t))
, (A.31)
where an equivalent equation holds in the foreign region. Note that the vari-
ety index i can be dropped since prices and therefore profits are equal for all
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firms. Applying the definitions of regional share variables and global quan-
tities as well as the definition of trade openness yields the final expressions
for regional rental rates8
pi =
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)(
ξEW
σKW
)
,
pi∗ =
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)(
ξEW
σKW
)
.
A.1.4 Intermediate results for the stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix Jsym, which is evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium
and given in equation (2.30), has the following entries Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4:
J1 =
1
2(φ+ 1)
√
σ
(
A(φ+ 2)−Bφ (A+B)φ
(A+B)φ A(φ+ 2)−Bφ
)
,
J2 =
 −ai(A+B)2(φ2+1)4(φ+1)2ξ − aiµ(µ+ ρ) − (A+B)2aiφ2(φ+1)2ξ
− (A+B)2aiφ
2(φ+1)2ξ
−ai(A+B)2(φ2+1)
4(φ+1)2ξ
− aiµ(µ+ ρ)
 ,
J3 =
1
ai(φ+ 1)σ
(
ξ − (φ+ 1)σ φξ
φξ ξ − (φ+ 1)σ
)
,
J4 =
 φ(A+ρ√σ)−δ(φ2+φ+1)√σ(φ+1)2√σ − (A+B)φ(φ+1)2√σ
− (A+B)φ
(φ+1)2
√
σ
φ(A+ρ√σ)−δ(φ2+φ+1)√σ
(φ+1)2
√
σ

with the parameter clusters A ≡ √σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4µ(µ+ ρ)ξ as well as B ≡
(δ + ρ)
√
σ.
In order to get a first insight into the nature and signs of the eigenvalues
of Jsym, we calibrated the model using the parameter values ρ = 0.015 and
δ = 0.05 and allowing the elasticity of substitution and the manufacturing
share of consumption to vary within the ranges 2 ≤ σ ≤ 8 and 0.1 ≤ ξ ≤ 0.9.
Figures A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4 illustrate the numerical investigation of the
signs of the eigenvalues for σ = 4, ξ = 0.3 and varying µ and φ.9
8We ignore time arguments here.
9We also conducted the same simulations for other values of σ and ξ within the consid-
ered range. Overall, our findings with respect to the signs of the eigenvalues are insensitive
to changes in those parameters.
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Figure A.1: Eigenvalue 1 for varying µ and φ
Figure A.2: Eigenvalue 2 for varying µ and φ
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Figure A.3: Eigenvalue 3 for varying µ and φ
Figure A.4: Eigenvalue 4 for varying µ and φ
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First, the figures suggest that all eigenvalues are real for the chosen pa-
rameter space. Moreover, figures A.1, A.2 and A.4 show that the first eigen-
value is always negative, whereas the second and fourth are always positive.
This result is independent of the level of transport costs and the mortality
rate. Saddle path stability of the symmetric equilibrium therefore seems to
crucially depend on the third eigenvalue by requiring it to be negative. As
can be seen from the 3D plot in figure A.3 there only exists a very small range
of combinations of low µ and high φ where the sign of the third eigenvalue
is positive. One is therefore tempted to conclude that with a sufficiently
high mortality rate, the symmetric equilibrium is stable for all levels of trade
openness.
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A.2 Chapter 3
A.2.1 Aggregation over individuals
Cohort size
Since e−µ(t−t0) is the probability of an individual of a cohort born at t0 to
survive to time t and the cohort size of newborns is given by N(t0, t0) =
βN(t0), the size of a cohort born at t0 at time t can be rewritten as
N(t0, t) = βN(t0)e
−µ(t−t0)
= βN(0)ent0e−µ(t−t0)
= βN(0)e(β−µ)t0e−µ(t−t0)
= βN(0)eβt0e−µt
= βeβt0e−µt, (A.32)
where we use that population size N(t) grows with n = β−µ and we normalize
N(0) = 1.
Aggregate expenditures and capital
To obtain the laws of motion of per capita expenditures and capital, we
must first derive the aggregate consumption rule and the aggregate law of
motion of capital. First, note that individual utility maximization yields the
individual consumption expenditures rule10
e(t0, t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)[k(t0, t) + h(t)], (A.33)
where
h(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
l
ai
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ (A.34)
is human wealth of individuals in capital units, i.e. the present value of
lifetime wage income with the annuity factor e−R
A(t,τ) ≡ e−
∫ τ
t
(
pi(s)
w(s)ai
+µ−δ
)
ds
used for discounting. Optimal individual consumption expenditures in the
10For details of the derivations see chapter 2 and its appendix A.1.
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planning period t in capital units, e(t0,t)
aiw(t)
, are proportional to total wealth with
the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth being constant and
equal to the effective rate of time preference ρ+µ. As will become clear soon,
it is also necessary to derive an expression for the law of motion of individual
human wealth being equal to per capita human wealth.11 Applying twice the
Leibniz rule to equation (A.34) yields
˙˜h(t) = h˙(t) = − l
ai
+
∫ ∞
t
l
ai
e−R
A(t,τ)(−1)
[
−
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
+ µ− δ
)]
dτ
=
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
+ µ− δ
)
h(t)− l
ai
. (A.35)
Using equation (A.33) in equation (3.9) yields the aggregate consumption
expenditure rule
E(t) = β
∫ t
−∞
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)[k(t0, t) + h(t)]e
−µt+βt0dt0
= β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)e
−µt
∫ t
−∞
[k(t0, t) + h(t)]e
βt0dt0
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t) [K(t) +H(t)] , (A.36)
where
H(t) = βe−µt
∫ t
−∞
h(t)eβt0dt0 = h(t)e
(β−µ)t (A.37)
represents aggregate human wealth.
The law of motion of aggregate capital can be obtained from equation
11With age independency, individual variables of course equal per capita variables, e.g.
h˜(t) = h(t) and l˜ = l.
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(3.8) by again applying the Leibniz rule as
K˙(t) = β
k(t, t)e(β−µ)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
−0
+
β
[∫ t
−∞
k˙(t0, t)e
βt0e−µtdt0 +
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)e
βt0e−µ(−µ)dt0
]
= −µK(t) +
β
∫ t
−∞
(
w(t)l + pi(t)k(t0, t)− e(t0, t)
w(t)ai
+ (µ− δ)k(t0, t)
)
eβt0e−µtdt0
= −µK(t) + L(t)
ai
− E(t)
w(t)ai
+
pi(t)
w(t)ai
K(t) + µK(t)− δK(t)
=
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
K(t) +
L(t)
ai
− E(t)
w(t)ai
, (A.38)
where we used the individual law of motion of capital given in equation (3.3)
to go from the first to the second line.12 In contrast to the individual law
of motion of capital (3.3), the aggregate law of motion for capital does not
feature the mortality rate, since µK(t) just captures the transfer of capital
of dying to surviving individuals by the life insurance companies which does
not change the rate of return on aggregate capital.
Based on this aggregate law of motion of capital we are now ready to
obtain the law of motion of per capita capital as
˙˜k(t) = K˙(t)e−nt +K(t)e−nt(−n)
=
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
K(t) +
L(t)
ai
− E(t)
w(t)ai
)
]
e−nt +K(t)e−nt(−n)
=
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
+
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
k˜(t)− nk˜(t)
=
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − β + µ
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
.
Finally, the per capita Euler equation is obtained from differentiating
the per capita version of the aggregate consumption rule given in equation
12Recall also that capital holdings of newborns k(t,t) are zero by assumption (no be-
quests).
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(A.36) with respect to time and substituting in the per capita law of motions
of capital and human wealth. This yields
e˜(t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[
k˜(t) + h˜(t)
]
(A.39)
˙˜e(t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[
˙˜k(t) + ˙˜h(t)
]
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − n
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
]
+
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ + µ
)
h˜(t)− l˜
ai
]
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
(
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
)
+ (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)[
k˜(t) + h˜(t)
]
+
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[
−nk˜(t) + µh˜(t)
]
.
Substituting in e˜(t) from equation (A.39), we can rewrite ˙˜e(t) as
˙˜e(t) = (ρ+ µ) (−e˜(t)) + ˜e(t)
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
+ (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[
−nk˜(t) + µh˜(t)
]
=
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
− (ρ+ µ)
]
e˜(t) + (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)µh˜(t)− n(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
=
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
− (ρ+ µ)
]
e˜(t) + (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)µ
[
e˜(t)
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
− k˜(t)
]
−n(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
=
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
e˜(t) +
[
−µ(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)(k˜(t))− n(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
]
=
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
e˜(t)− β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t),
where we used that h˜(t) = e˜(t)
(ρ+µ)aiw(t)
− k˜(t).
Therefore we have a two dimensional dynamic system of the following
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form
˙˜e(t) =
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
e˜(t)− β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
˙˜k(t) =
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − β + µ
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
with analogous equations holding in the foreign region.
Note, finally, that by using equation (A.39) and equation (A.33) for t0 = t
the law of motion of per capita consumption expenditures can be rewritten
as
˙˜e(t)
e˜(t)
=
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
− β e˜(t)− e(t, t)
e˜(t)
=
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
− β e˜(t)− e(t, t)
e˜(t)
.
A.2.2 Derivation of rental rates
Rental rates given in equations (3.16) and (3.17) can be rewritten as13
pi =
(
E
K + φK∗
+
E∗φ
φK +K∗
)(
ξ
σ
)
,
pi∗ =
(
E∗
K∗ + φK
+
Eφ
φK∗ +K
)(
ξ
σ
)
.
By multiplying the nominator as well as the denominator by e−nt, we arrive
at
pi =
(
e˜
k˜ + φk˜∗
+
e˜∗φ
φk˜ + k˜∗
)(
ξ
σ
)
, (A.40)
pi∗ =
(
e˜∗
k˜∗ + φk˜
+
e˜φ
φk˜∗ + k˜
)(
ξ
σ
)
. (A.41)
13Note that we suppress time arguments here.
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A.2.3 Intermediate results for the stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix Jsym, which is evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium
and given in equation (3.24), has the following entries Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4
J1 =
1
2(φ+ 1)
√
σ
(
A(φ+ 2)−Bφ φ(A+B)
φ(A+B) A(φ+ 2)−Bφ
)
,
J2 =
 −ai(φ2+1)(A+B)24(φ+1)2ξ − βai(µ+ ρ) −aiφ(A+B)22(φ+1)2ξ
−aiφ(A+B)22(φ+1)2ξ −
ai(φ2+1)(A+B)2
4(φ+1)2ξ − βai(µ+ ρ)
 ,
J3 =
1
ai(φ+ 1)σ
(
ξ − (φ+ 1)σ φξ
φξ ξ − (φ+ 1)σ
)
,
J4 =
 Aφ+√σ(−β(φ+1)2−δ(φ2+φ+1)+µ(φ+1)2+φρ)(φ+1)2√σ − φ(A+B)(φ+1)2√σ
− φ(A+B)
(φ+1)2
√
σ
Aφ+
√
σ(−β(φ+1)2−δ(φ2+φ+1)+µ(φ+1)2+φρ)
(φ+1)2
√
σ

with the parameter clusters A ≡ √σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4β(µ+ ρ)ξ as well as B ≡
(δ + ρ)
√
σ.
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A.3 Chapter 4
A.3.1 Intermediate results for the stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix given in equation (4.27) has the following entries
J11 = −ηL− L− ρ+
(ηL+ L+ ρ+ eig1)
(
η + ηξ−ηφξφσ+σ + 2
)
2(η + 1)
,
J12 =
η (ηL+ L+ ρ+ eig1)
(
(φ−1)ξ
(φ+1)σ + 1
)
2(η + 1)
,
J13 =
4η
 (ηL+L+ρ+eig1)
(
−Lη2+L+ 12 (ηL+L+ρ+eig1)
(
η− 2(ηφ
2−2φ+η)ξ
(φ+1)2σ
−1
))
2(η+1) − µ(µ+ ρ)

(η + 1)2
,
J31 = − (η + 1)((φ+ 1)σ + (φ− 1)ξ)4(φ+ 1)σ ,
J33 =
(ηL+ L+ ρ+ eig1)
(
η − (ηφ
2−2φ+η)ξ
(φ+1)2σ
)
η + 1
− 2Lη,
where eig1 =
√
L2(η + 1)2 + 2Lρ(η + 1) + (2µ+ ρ)2.
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Zusammenfassung
Wie beeinflussen demografische Strukturen Agglomerationsprozesse? Die
drei Artikel dieser Dissertation widmen sich der Beantwortung dieser Frage,
indem sie die Auswirkungen von demografischem Wandel sowohl auf die
ra¨umliche Verteilung von o¨konomischer Aktivita¨t als auch auf den Zusam-
menhang von Wachstum und Agglomeration untersuchen.
Der erste Aufsatz entwickelt ein neuartiges theoretisches Basismodell, das
einen New Economic Geography Ansatz um u¨berlappende Generationen er-
weitert. Dies ermo¨glicht es, den grundlegenden Zusammenhang zwischen
demografischen Strukturen und Agglomeration zu analysieren. Durch die
Beru¨cksichtigung von Lebenszyklen, im Besonderen durch die Verteilungsef-
fekte infolge des Generationenwechsels, werden Agglomerationsprozesse deut-
lich abgeschwa¨cht. Fu¨r plausible demografische Strukturen findet Agglomer-
ation somit auch bei zunehmender o¨konomischer Integration nicht statt.
Der zweite Artikel erweitert das Basismodell um eine detaillierte Mod-
ellierung von demografischen Wandel, indem er unterschiedliche Geburten-
und Sterberaten und somit variierende Bevo¨lkerungsgro¨ßen zula¨sst. Dadurch
ko¨nnen sowohl die Auswirkungen von A¨nderungen in der Altersstruktur
als auch in der Bevo¨lkerungswachstumsrate analysiert werden. Wa¨hrend
Bevo¨lkerungsalterung Agglomerationstendenzen versta¨rkt, erweist sich
Bevo¨lkerungswachstum als Dispersionskraft.
Erweitert man, wie im dritten Artikel, das Modell schließlich um en-
dogenes Wachstum aufgrund von Lerneffekten, kann auch die Rolle von
demografischen Strukturen fu¨r den Zusammenhang zwischen Wachstum
und ra¨umlicher Verteilung von o¨konomischer Aktivita¨t analysiert wer-
den. Generell senkt die Beru¨cksichtigung von begrenzter Lebensdauer
die langfristigen Wachstumsraten. Gleichzeitig wird dadurch der wachs-
tumsfo¨rdernde Effekt von Agglomeration infolge von ra¨umlich begrenzten
Lerneffekten abgeschwa¨cht.
Abstract
How do demographic structures impact upon agglomeration processes? The
three articles comprising this thesis are dedicated toward answering this ques-
tion by focusing on the effects of demographic change on both the spatial
distribution of economic activity and the linkage between growth and ag-
glomeration.
The first essay develops a novel theoretical baseline framework that merges
the two research strands of New Economic Geography and overlapping gener-
ation models. This allows to establish and analyze the main linkage between
demography and agglomeration processes. We find that the introduction of
an overlapping generation structure considerably reduces agglomeration ten-
dencies due to the distributional effects from the turnover of generations. For
plausible demographic structures, agglomeration processes thus do not set in
even if economic integration is promoted up to a high degree.
The second article extends the above benchmark model with a view to
focusing on the effects of changes in both the population age structure and
in the population growth rate on agglomeration processes. To do so, it in-
corporates a more detailed analysis of demographic change by allowing for
unequal birth and death rates and thus varying population size. While pop-
ulation aging strengthens agglomeration tendencies, population growth acts
as a dispersion force.
Finally, the third essay additionally allows for endogenous growth due to
learning spillovers in order to also investigate the impact of demography on
the linkage between growth and the spatial distribution of economic activity.
Lifetime uncertainty is shown to decrease long-run growth perspectives. In
doing so, it mitigates the pro-growth effects of agglomeration resulting from
the localized nature of learning spillovers.
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